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ABSTRACT
This Article develops how the judiciary should play an instrumental part in
amplifying the parent’s voice as a citizenship broker for their child. The Supreme
Court scrutinizes school-board actions with little consideration of parents’ substan-
tive due process right to control their child’s education through the political process.
Through representative school boards, effective participation models, and an enforce-
ment framework, parents could hold the power to affect education policies. Parents
deserve full citizenship recognition in the tiered processes controlling public education
policy. In addition to recognizing “quality” education as a government interest, the
Supreme Court should also take into account the political processes underlying the
adoption of education reforms. We should earnestly grapple with the intersection be-
tween our equal protection doctrine’s deference to local control and the fundamental
yet limited right for parents to control their child’s education.
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INTRODUCTION
The political kaleidoscope known as education governance spans every branch
and every level of government. As a nation, we find ourselves fixated with the waver-
ing currents of federal intrusion and states’ rights, but all the while, social and eco-
nomic unrest stirs at the local level. From Chicago in the Midwest, to California on
the West Coast, to Tennessee in the South, poor white and ethnic communities battle
common issues, and parents cannot edge forward against vast education bureau-
cracies and costly political-interest establishments. Parents deserve full citizenship
recognition in the tiered processes controlling public-education policy. Parental in-
volvement seems particularly important for reforms meant to improve the academic
performance of student populations striving to overcome adversities that coalesce
to create unique educational needs.
In the public education context, economic disruption continues to prompt drastic
actions by local officials and community members. In Chicago and Philadelphia,
during the 2012–2013 academic year, non-elected school boards shuttered dozens
of public facilities in spite of protests to save these neighborhood institutions. Such
draconian measures incited activists to send smoke signals so far as the United
Nations and U.S. Department of Education. Naturally, parents lamented over the
closing of local schools, but most disconcerting, they felt disassociated from the
decision-making process. Parents have expressed similar fears with regards to the
largest district consolidation in our nation’s history, also pacing forward during the
2012–2013 academic year. These stark examples of strained government and com-
munity relations also appear in areas servicing large immigrant populations.
Parents occupy an overlapping, dual space in education reform, as guardian and as
citizen. In both functions, parents advocate on behalf of their children. As a citizen,
more so than as a guardian, parents assume agency responsibilities that saddle them
with the duties of a participating citizen and/or citizen by proxy. Accordingly, by
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default, parents embody the potential to assume an all-encompassing role in redirecting
public education reform efforts. Federal constitutional and statutory law fully recog-
nizes the guardian role and provides limited enforcement; however, it falls short of ac-
commodating the parents’ role as a citizenship broker for their children’s future interest.
Interestingly, for education policies concerning race, unlike other school policies
challenged by parents, the Supreme Court applies strict scrutiny with little consider-
ation of parents’ substantive due process right to control their child’s education
through the political process. Through representative school boards, effective par-
ticipation models, and an enforcement framework, parents could hold the power to
greatly affect education policies. The current system and applicable law either ex-
clude or dilute to a detrimental degree the political influence that can only be pro-
cured from the collective action of a diverse parent stakeholder group.
The Court’s Fourteenth Amendment analysis ignores a factor “fundamental” to
developing public education policies: parental participation. In Defining Quality
Education as a Government Interest,1 I proposed that the Supreme Court should
recognize quality education, as defined by state constitutional education clauses, to
be a government interest sufficient to justify the use of protected classifications.2 But
under an expansive interpretation of the equal protection doctrine in the education
context, this recognition would not accommodate the full extent of leeway necessary
to bring about dynamic change in our public-education system. Federal courts should
expand their deference given to local authorities under the Fourteenth Amendment’s
“local control” doctrine to include a review of the opportunities parents and commu-
nity members have to participate in the deliberation process. For the parents of school-
age children, such consideration would be justified based on their fundamental right
to parent, which receives protection through substantive due process.
This Article focuses on how legislation and the judiciary may play an instrumental
part in amplifying the parents’ voice as a citizen by proxy for their child, especially in
light of the multilayered governance system implemented for operating public schools.
When contemplating broader education reforms, beyond home and school, parents
must articulate their children’s needs as citizenship brokers3 working via proxy4
1 Tiffani N. Darden, Defining Quality Education as a Government Interest: The U.S.
Supreme Court’s Refusal to “Play Nice” with the Executive Branch, Congress, State Supreme
Courts, and the Community Voice, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 661 (2012).
2 Id. This shift in the Court’s current analysis of education policies would allay several
concerns: (1) an ever-evolving state jurisprudence on education; (2) the need to consider
regional and district-specific needs; and (3) that closing the achievement gap may require
“something” different and yet unknown for poor and certain racial and ethnic minority
communities. See id. at 697–98, 707, 716–17.
3 A broker is a person who functions as an intermediary between two or more parties in
negotiating agreements, bargains, or the like. See OED ONLINE, http://www.oed.com (last
visited Apr. 15, 2014) (defining “broker, n.”).
4 A proxy is the agency, function, or power of a person authorized to act as the deputy or
substitute for another or an ally or confederate who can be relied upon to speak or act in one’s
behalf. See OED ONLINE, http://www.oed.com (last visited Apr. 15, 2014) (defining “proxy, n.”).
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through an ineffective deliberative democracy and minimally realized participation.
This statement applies most acutely to the parents of at risk students and the parents
of immigrant children.
Education politics erect significant obstacles for parents, especially those advo-
cating for policies and school-board representatives dedicated to the success of mar-
ginalized students. In this respect, the law underestimates the pivotal role parents
serve in improving the academic performance of disadvantaged students. Therefore, a
central question arises: Does federal law threaten to impede the marginalized parents’
role as a citizenship broker, forced to work at a disadvantage on behalf of their in-
nocently “at-risk” children?
As discussed in detail below, the Supreme Court defers to local government de-
cisions when determining the constitutionality of school policies. After absorbing the
Court’s treatment of the Seattle School District’s efforts to create a diversity policy
in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,5 the
Court needs to reinvigorate its deference to local control by redefining the doctrine’s
scope. The Court’s limited view developed focuses exclusively on the outcomes from
school-board deliberations without appreciating that the school board represents the
voice of citizens interested in the public school students’ welfare.
Redefining local control and recognizing its potential to amplify the public’s
voice includes the responsibility of ensuring that “voice” means adequate represen-
tation through county and district school boards. In the education context, I believe
that local control has been inappropriately disconnected from the historically estab-
lished fundamental right of parents to direct their children’s education. Reverence
to this fundamental right would permit the expansion of local control, through ac-
counting for political involvement, to include undocumented immigrants, and it
would focus greater attention to the procedure and access hurdles in place that deter
the involvement from socioeconomically disadvantaged parents.
With these concerns in mind, from a prospective stance, parents stand to serve
as citizenship brokers for their children in the public education system. To achieve
this future for their children, parents are citizenship proxies needed to advocate the
educational quality concerns of their children in the present. As shown below, the
school board represents a fulcrum to balance the parents’ formal and informal obli-
gations to their child’s educational future because school-board composition affects
student achievement. Therefore, the Supreme Court’s doctrine should grapple with
the intersection of the equal protection doctrine’s deference to local control and the
fundamental yet limited right for parents to control their child’s education. If we
tackle this problem at the political level, then there is no need to interfere with the
well-grounded principle of parents not crossing over into controlling the day-to-day
operation led by educational experts.
This Article considers the legal implications of school-board consolidations, a
rapidly growing yet under-represented Latino population, and the increasing cost of
5 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
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the national interest-group influences on school-board elections. Part I focuses on
the shared governance structure in the public education context and how these many
layers threaten to suffocate the pathway for parents to interject their opinions. It also
criticizes current parental engagement statutes implemented by state governments
at the direction of federal mandates. Part II describes the inherent tension between
parents and state authorities when making educational decisions. Courts must con-
sider the fundamental right to parent when evaluating the constitutionality of using
race and other categories to formulate reforms in the education context. This argu-
ment finds support in the clear advantages to local control and studies showing how
parent participation improves educational outcomes.
Part III examines recent school-district-level events. These examples illustrate
the challenges to protecting a space for parents of marginalized, at-risk children want-
ing adequate representation of their interests through the political process. Therefore,
the traditional definition for local control must expand to include parents, and the
Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence should reflect this expansion. Part IV
concludes these arguments by considering the practical consequences associated with
greater parent involvement in public schools.
I. EXPANDING THE TANGLED LANDSCAPE OF PUBLIC EDUCATION GOVERNANCE
TO INCLUDE PARENTS IN THE LOCAL CONTROL DOCTRINE
In Defining Quality Education as a Government Interest, I argued that judges
should forgo one-dimensional classifications and defer to policymakers at every level
of elected government, determining constitutionality based on the fulfillment of state
constitutional standards and the political process implemented to enact a given policy.6
A fine line exists between local control and judicial powers when declaring the con-
stitutionality of education policies. The assigned level of scrutiny affects the leniency
given to government actors. If state constitutions are the first step for litigants wanting
to challenge any form of educational insufficiencies, then the Fourteenth Amendment
serves as a backstop, requiring the Supreme Court to still defer to state policymakers
and state courts. The Department of Education, through its regulations, also serves
as a quality check for public education. But how does law account for political par-
ticipation in reforming education policy?
Group conflict deriving from value differences centers on problem identifica-
tion, program implementation, and outcome evaluation.7 One common challenge
6 See Darden, supra note 1, at 664.
7 See MICHAEL W. KIRST & FREDERICK M. WIRT, THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF AMERI-
CAN EDUCATION 38 (4th ed. 2009). Kirst and Wirt suggest two propositions for explaining
the relationship between politics and governance: (1) “politics is a form of social conflict
rooted in group differences over values about using public resources to meet private needs”
and (2) “governance is the process of publicly resolving that group conflict by means of cre-
ating and administering public policy.” Id. at 36 (emphasis added). Within local-educational
governance, conflicts arise among the thousands of districts with regards to prioritizing their
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expressed by the public involves its inability to participate in education reform to
the same extent as other constituencies, such as teachers and professional reformers.8
Such sentiments lead to a loss of confidence in the system and, at worst, a retreat
from public education.9 The next Part discusses the local control doctrine and why
the traditional deference given to local school officials should be preserved, if and
when parents are able to robustly and effectively participate in the decision-making
process. Although laden with imperfection, as discussed below, local control of schools
still offers invaluable advantages.
A. Why (or Why Not) Local Control?
Unlike the federal courts, federal, state, and local officials must answer to their
constituents regarding the soundness of education reform. In addition, state and local
officials are held accountable under their respective state constitutions, which have
been interpreted to include the right to an adequate and/or quality education. Thus,
a tension arises between elected officials crafting policies to support those struggling
in the public education system and federal judges’ encroachment on the role of state
courts in their review of education policies. Who should prevail? In the first instance,
federal courts should defer to school officials because the education context presents
unique considerations. Even further, the legislative process calls on courts to study
legislative records for legitimate support of policies, not merely pass judgment on the
information used to resolve an issue but also to review which stakeholders chimed
in and received legitimate consideration.
Although the Court’s local control doctrine should dig deeper to appreciate the
parent’s role in school-district affairs, by appreciating them as citizenship brokers.
The focus on local school-board actions emanates from their intermediary role in en-
suring the execution of policies and procedures crafted to achieve state and federal
standards.10 Officials need buy-in from the community on their policies and their
station as policymakers to successfully manage a school district.
various concerns, challenges to education reform, and the disparate improvement rate for
identifiable groups in response to change. Id.
8 See id. at 39.
9 Id.
10 See Max Neiman et al., Examining Latino Representation on California’s School
Boards: Its Impact of Perceptions of District Problems, Priorities, and Policies, CESAR E.
CHAVEZ INST. POL’Y RES. SERIES, Oct. 2010, at 18, available at http://cci.sfsu.edu/schoolboards
(“[S]chool board members make critical decisions regarding the distribution of resources
through adopting annual school budgets, curriculum design regarding interpretation of state
and national standards, disciplinary policies, negotiation of teacher contracts, and relations
with parent teacher associations.”); see also Luis Ricardo Fraga & Roy Elis, Interests and
Representation: Ethnic Advocacy on California School Boards, 111 TCHRS. C. REC. 659, 660
(2009); Ashley D. Ross et al., Latino Representation and Education: Pathways to Latino
Student Performance, 10 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 69, 72, 74 (2010).
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School boards “tax, budget, spend, incur debt, hire, fire, bargain with labor, and set
policy generally.”11 Citizens experience direct access to the political process through
elections and referenda on specific issues.12 Some issues may never come before the
political process due to their depressed social value or their advocates’ lack of re-
sources necessary to move the issue along.13 In an ideal system, the school board acts
as a liaison between community stakeholders and school administrators.14 In this
layered bureaucracy, states provide oversight to monitor local school districts and
hold them accountable for standards.15
Many reasons justify the traditionally held preference for local control over pub-
lic schools.16 First, local decisions seem more democratic than decisions imposed by
state and federal governments.17 Local politicians focus on a much smaller constituent
base than state and federal officials.18 From the citizen’s viewpoint, local politicians are
often more accessible and connected to the schools and their neighborhoods. The re-
stricted constituent pool and better access translate into greater influence over education
11 Aaron J. Saiger, The School District Boundary Problem, 42 URB. LAW. 495, 502 (2010)
[hereinafter Saiger, The School District Boundary Problem].
12 See KIRST & WIRT, supra note 7, at 101.
13 Id. at 134 (“Whether meeting or blocking a citizen demand, however, the board is not
static nor are its members value free. They modify, regulate, innovate, or refuse political de-
mands in response to a variety of value preferences.”).
14 See id. at 135. Unfortunately, political attitudes have led us to move away from the
original conception of local control to directly include parents, but the more elaborate con-
temporary system still respects the role of school boards because this “level of government
generally considered closest to the home and family serves to mitigate . . . threat[s] to family
interests.” Richard Briffault, The Role of Local Control in School Finance Reform, 24 CONN.
L. REV. 773, 785 (1992); see also Parker, infra note 34, at 1705–06; Aaron J. Saiger, The
Last Wave: The Rise of the Contingent School District, 84 N.C. L. REV. 857, 863 (2006)
[hereinafter Saiger, The Last Wave] (“American education begins with localities. Local con-
trol of schools is a nationwide and longstanding American practice.”); Benjamin Michael
Superfine, Stimulating School Reform: The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act and
the Shifting Federal Role in Education, 76 MO. L. REV. 81, 87 (2011) (“[E]ven though legal
authority over education has technically rested with states, school boards and local commu-
nities have exercised much of the power to make educational decisions.”).
15 State governments establish school boards and delegate to local officials limited author-
ity for operating the public schools. School boards are a creation of the state. See Briffault,
supra note 14, at 777; Saiger, The Last Wave, supra note 14, at 865; Saiger, The School
District Boundary Problem, supra note 11, at 509. States are free to strip them of control so
long as there is a rational basis for decision. See, e.g., KIRST & WIRT, supra note 7, at 132;
Briffault, supra note 14, at 777; Saiger, The Last Wave, supra note 14, at 915.
16 Saiger, The School District Boundary Problem, supra note 11, at 519–20.
17 See Briffault, supra note 14, at 797 (“Nonetheless, ‘local control as accountability and
participation’ is certainly the least wealth-biased meaning of local control and the one that
most resonates with the normative assumptions about local self-government that have long
been basic to American political thinking.”).
18 KIRST & WIRT, supra note 7, at 145–46.
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policymakers.19 Deciding policies through democratic deliberations and procedures
inculcates local control to a greater degree than relying on the litigation process.20 Al-
though courts and federal agencies may impose national standards, the desire to uphold
local implementation remains a central ideal.21 Second, policies enacted on the local
level better reflect the nuanced circumstances experienced by the district’s student pop-
ulation.22 Third, local control helps build public opinion for schools and participation.23
Local control does not always work toward the noble liberal democratic goal of
bringing together diverse citizens in educating children to live in a diverse society.
Geographic boundaries, too often tracking property values, permit citizens to isolate
themselves to the disadvantage of at-risk students.24 Through local control, school dis-
tricts bear a responsibility exclusive to their resident student population.25 Professor
Aaron Saiger argues that local control “inflicts homogeneity and stratification upon
polities, limits the educational opportunity of poor students, and deprives all students
of the experience of democratic schooling in diverse schools.”26 Consolidation and
redistricting combat these downfalls to some extent but exacerbate other barriers to
reform, such as finding common ground in a multiethnic electorate and balancing
the interests of politically dominant and marginalized groups.27 Rather than confront
these challenges, upper- to middle-class families often form their own insular school
districts.28 Local control provides cover for citizens and parents attempting to shirk
the greater community’s challenges to quality, diverse educational opportunities.29
19 Briffault, supra note 14, at 795 (“Administrators, education professionals, teachers’
unions, business groups, politicians, and others all may seek to influence or control education
decisions. Implicit in the ‘local control as accountability’ concept is the belief that the gen-
eral public will have a better chance of influencing education decisionmaking and holding
politicians, bureaucrats, and public employees accountable for educational performance, or
the lack of it, if decision-making control is kept at the local level.”).
20 Parker, infra note 34, at 1753.
21 See id. at 1757.
22 See KIRST & WIRT, supra note 7, at 145–46; Parker, infra note 34, at 1753–55.
23 KIRST & WIRT, supra note 7, at 146; Briffault, supra note 14, at 795.
24 Briffault, supra note 14, at 803, 805 (describing “fiscal zoning” and economic barriers
to community integration).
25 Saiger, The School District Boundary Problem, supra note 11, at 504 (“[T]he territo-
rially sovereign district, responsible only for its own resident students and not those nearby,
has been a preeminent tool for resisting the racial integration of schools.”).
26 Id. at 524 (footnotes omitted).
27 See id. at 495–97.
28 See Erica Frankenberg, Splintering School Districts: Understanding the Link Between
Segregation and Fragmentation, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 869 (2009) (analyzing the creation
of new school districts in Jefferson County, Alabama).
29 See Briffault, supra note 14, at 787 (“In communities where the parents of school-age
children are in the minority, where some sizeable number of parents have chosen to send their
children to private or parochial schools, or where parents and nonparents may be of different
ethnic groups, local control of school budgets may harm, not help, parents’ interests.”).
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In Splintering School Districts: Understanding the Link Between Segregation
and Fragmentation, Professor Erica Frankenberg demonstrates through a case study
of Jefferson County, Alabama, the ability of residents to split the county into small
districts in the name of local control, which in turn perpetuates racial segregation.30
Thus, these citizens constitutionally bypass mandatory desegregation requirements
by using homogenous residential concentrations to form racially isolated districts
around the Birmingham-metropolitan area.31 Professor Frankenberg addresses the
idea of local government as antigovernment in that the citizens represent the “inter-
ests of a small, homogeneous group of residents from a larger government represent-
ing a more heterogeneous group; this prevents the development of a pluralistic
perspective.”32 She concludes that these small districts have “limited democratic
control and thwarted the development of regional policies where multiple constitu-
encies had representation.”33
Without question, local control presents land mines to achieving quality education
for all public school students. However, a slight tweak to our local control doctrine
would open the deliberative process to constitutional scrutiny. Looking past school
board decisions and examining the deliberative process brings about a legitimacy not
previously considered when implementing policies affecting race and wealth clas-
sifications. The next Part discusses the local control doctrine and why the traditional
deference given to local school officials should be preserved, if and when parents
are able to robustly and effectively participate in the decision-making process. Al-
though laden with imperfection, as discussed below, local control of schools still
offers invaluable advantages. Many scholars addressing the “local control” doctrine
believe it to exist within the Fourteenth Amendment’s contours.34 In looking back
on these cases, I explore how the Court defines local control while avoiding a full
account of its use and the resulting consequences.
30 Frankenberg, supra note 28, at 903.
31 Id. at 870, 877–78 (using a case-study method of Jefferson County, Alabama, to show
how within-district segregation may be on the decline based on district demographics, while
during the same time period, between-district segregation continues to grow exponentially).
32 Id. at 882 (referring to Gregory Weiher’s argument).
33 Id. at 883.
34 Professor Wendy Parker provides a comprehensive review and analysis, explaining that
the school desegregation movement from Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294
(1955), to pre–Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701 (2007), demonstrates an arc in the Court’s re-
liance on local control in determining the constitutionality of race-based education policies.
See Wendy Parker, Connecting the Dots: Grutter, School Desegregation, and Federalism, 45
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1691, 1705–06 (2004); see also Philip T.K. Daniel & Mark A. Gooden,
Conflict on the United States Supreme Court: Judicial Confusion and Race-Conscious School
Assignments, 2010 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 81, 90–95 (discussing Justice Breyer’s dissent in Parents
Involved); Preston C. Green, III, Julie F. Mead & Joseph O. Oluwole, Parents Involved, School
Assignment Plans, and the Equal Protection Clause: The Case for Special Constitutional
Rules, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 503, 515–16 (2011).
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B. Local Control’s Fair Weather Journey
Federal courts prefer to leave public-education decisions to local officials in-
stead of inserting themselves in the school district’s operational affairs.35 Local con-
trol permits decisionmakers to create a system unique to their student population
using their professional expertise, a capacity many judges lack.36 In defining local
control, the starting point with Brown v. Board of Education seems to encompass
only the school board and state legislature.37 This era, prior to the passage of the
Civil Rights Act and greater Supreme Court intervention, marked a low point in
local control’s potential to enact equitable norms.38
In Brown I, the Court recognized the local nature of education policies.39 Justice
Warren overruled “separate-but-equal” with a measured temperance.40 The desegre-
gation remedy required affirmative changes in state law, but the Court reserved to
state and local officials the discretion to choose their methods.41 The Court delin-
eated the role of school officials and the judiciary as follows: “School authorities
have the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving . . . [policy]
problems; courts will have to consider whether the action of school authorities con-
stitutes good faith implementation of the governing constitutional principles.”42
In applying Brown’s desegregation principles, Milliken v. Bradley43 presented
an opportunity to fully explore the federal court’s power to reform school districts in
light of local and state violations.44 The Court concluded that local control, a “deeply
rooted” tradition,45 served two functions: “maintenance of community concern and
support for public schools”46 and “quality of the educational process.”47 With regards
to the community, quoting San Antonio v. Rodriguez,48 the Court declared that “local
35 See Parker, supra note 34, at 1695.
36 See id. at 1698, 1746.
37 See id. at 1706–13 (reviewing the cases following Brown I and the difficulties imple-
menting the desegregation mandate due to obstruction on the local level and certain courts).
38 See id. at 1716–17.
39 See Philip T.K. Daniel & Patrick D. Pauken, The PICS Decision—Academic Freedom
v. Federalism: Consider the Constitutional Implications, 18 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV.
111, 133 (2008); Danielle Holley-Walker, Educating at the Crossroads: Parents Involved, No
Child Left Behind and School Choice, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 911, 926 (2008) (footnote omitted).
40 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“We conclude that
in the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.”).
41 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955).
42 Id.
43 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
44 See id. at 721; see also Daniel & Pauken, supra note 39, at 134.
45 Milliken, 418 U.S. at 741.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 742.
48 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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control over the educational process affords citizens an opportunity to participate
in decisionmaking, permits the structuring of school programs to fit local needs,
and encourages ‘experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for educa-
tional excellence.’”49
In refusing to apply heightened scrutiny in Rodriguez, the Court seemed content
to stray from the debates regarding quality education and the cost of providing such
an undefined standard; instead, the Court advocated for local school officials to con-
tinue the “research and experimentation so vital to finding even partial solutions to
educational problems”50 with minimal interference from the bench.51 The Court ex-
tended the concept of local control to include not only the state’s autonomy but also
that of local school districts to distribute funds and create programs fitting the com-
munity’s needs.52
The Court’s reliance on local control to limit desegregation efforts and end fed-
eral oversight of desegregation decrees continued through the nineties.53 Justice
O’Connor succinctly stated, in Missouri v. Jenkins,54 that:
Unlike Congress, which enjoys discretion in determining whether
and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Four-
teenth Amendment, federal courts have no comparable license
and must always observe their limited judicial role. Indeed, . . .
federal courts are specifically admonished to take into account
the interests of state and local authorities in managing their own
affairs, in light of the intrusion into the area of education, where
States historically have been sovereign, and to which States lay
claim by right of history and expertise.55
Brown marked the federal courts’ entrance into public-education reform. The
nation’s social and political ideologies during the Brown journey required a strong,
assertive court to tip the scales in a new direction toward racial equality. The Court
explicitly acknowledged the law’s role in antagonizing oppressive social norms.56 The
supervisory role federal courts assumed through desegregation decrees proved an in-
surmountable challenge, and eventually, the judiciary retreated from this responsibility,
49 Milliken, 418 U.S. at 742 (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 50).
50 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 43.
51 Id.; see also Daniel & Pauken, supra note 39, at 133.
52 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 49–50. According to the majority, this type of pluralism in pub-
lic education policy “affords some opportunity for experimentation, innovation, and a healthy
competition for educational excellence.” Id.
53 Frankenberg, supra note 28, at 879–80.
54 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
55 Id. at 113 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
56 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 489–90 (1954).
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relying on deference to local control.57 But why should this respect for local control
not apply to all characteristics affecting a child’s academic performance? As set forth
in the following Part, the Court took a major detour from its deference to local con-
trol in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,58 a
case involving two voluntary desegregation initiatives.59
1. The Supreme Court’s Frustration: From Brown to Parents Involved in
Community Schools
The policies setting education-quality goals that gave rise to Parents Involved
in Community Schools marked a new era in defining the relationship between local
school districts and federal courts. Based on a number of factors, two districts imple-
mented voluntary desegregation plans after a period of heavy community participation
and district-specific need evaluations.60 Yet, the Court reneged on its promised fidel-
ity to local officials: A majority of the Court found their policies unconstitutional.61
After executing various unsuccessful assignment plans, the Seattle School Board
began to consider a new assignment plan in the mid-nineties.62 In 1996, it adopted the
Open Choice Plan, applying first only to elementary schools and then expanded to in-
clude secondary schools.63 “The Board reviewed the assignment plan . . . annually.”64
In its first review, “the Board debated whether to continue to use the integration tie-
breaker.”65 The Board decided in the affirmative and adopted a “Statement Reaffirming
57 Milliken I & II, along with Jenkins II, brought back local control over school districts.
See Daniel & Pauken, supra note 39, at 133; Parker, supra note 34, at 1722–28. Dowell,
Freeman, and Jenkins III “[a]ll three start with a statement of the longevity of the case, rec-
ognize continued segregation, and ultimately afford immediate return of complete local auton-
omy.” Parker, supra note 34, at 1730; see also Daniel & Pauken, supra note 39, at 122–24;
Holley-Walker, supra note 39, at 924–25; Anne Richardson Oakes, From Pedagogical Soci-
ology to Constitutional Adjudication: The Meaning of Desegregation in Social Science
Research and Law, 14 MICH. J. RACE & L. 61, 62 (2008); Wendy Parker, Limiting the Equal
Protection Clause Roberts Style, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 507, 522–23 (2009); Enid Trucios-
Haynes & Cedric Merlin Powell, The Rhetoric of Colorblind Constitutionalism: Individualism,
Race and Public Schools in Louisville, Kentucky, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 947, 964 (2008)
(“[T]he Dowell-Freeman-Jenkins line of decisions stand for the proposition that federal court
supervision is temporary and that local control should be returned as soon as practicable,
even if there are substantial lingering vestiges of discrimination.”).
58 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
59 See id.
60 Id. at 709–10.
61 Id. at 711; see Holley-Walker, supra note 39, at 913; Parker, supra note 57, at 533–34.
62 See Brief for Respondents at 5, Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (No. 05-908).
63 Id. at 5–6.
64 Id. at 7.
65 Id.
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Diversity Rationale” in which it provided reasons and justifications behind the
continued use of the integration tiebreaker.66 The Board pointed to the positive
effects of diversity, the negative effects of “racially isolated schools,” and its con-
cerns regarding “giving an unqualified priority to students living closest to the over-
subscribed schools would deny . . . [most] non-white students an opportunity to
attend these schools.”67
The following year, in the 2000 review, the Board again adjusted the assignment
plan.68 The Board determined that the integration plan would only apply to certain
schools, to certain grades, and only in school’s racial composition a broad range dur-
ing the assessment process.69 In addition, the Board directed the superintendent to
pay special attention to schools that were undersubscribed improving the quality of
the schools.70
As it began to develop an assignment plan, the Board reached out to the commu-
nity. It conducted an extensive study that included public forums and focus groups.71
“[I]t . . . knew that its constituents continued to place a high value on racial diversity
and equality of opportunity to attend quality schools.”72 The Board subsequently
adopted five “guiding principles” to be applied in development of
a new assignment plan: 1) enable children to attend school close
to home; 2) provide equal access to quality programs; 3) increase
the percentage of families assigned in their first choice school;
4) maximize diversity within each school; and 5) minimize man-
datory assignments based on race.73
In Louisville, a similar assignment plan was implemented to achieve integration
in schools. First, the Board adopted an open transfer policy; however, schools re-
mained segregated.74 Following a lawsuit, the Board was ordered “to create and to
maintain schools with student populations that ranged, for elementary schools,
66 Id. at 8.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 10.
69 Id. at 10–11 (“[I]t determined that the integration tiebreaker should only apply when
a school deviated by more than 15 percentage points from the overall racial composition of
the District. . . . The Board also determined that the integration tiebreaker should not apply
to grades 10 through 12. The Board additionally decided that the integration tiebreaker would
no longer apply if a school’s racial composition came within the broad 30 percentage point
range during the assignment process.”).
70 Id. at 11.
71 Id. at 5.
72 Id. at 39.
73 Id. at 5.
74 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Schs. District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 814
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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between 12% and 40% black, and for secondary schools . . . between 12.5% and
35%.”75 The district court also put forth an elaborate desegregation plan that re-
quired busing, among other things.76 However, several years later, the Board revised
its desegregation plan after realizing that many schools were no longer in compli-
ance with the court’s orders.77 Like the Seattle School Board, the Louisville School
Board considered the voice of the community. “[I]t consulted widely with parents
and other members of the local community, using public presentations, public meet-
ings, and various other methods to obtain the public’s input.”78 In 1996, the Board
enlisted the help of a “‘Planning Team,’ community meetings, and other official and
unofficial study groups . . . and considered proposals for improvement [to the assign-
ment plan].”79 Consequently, the Board modified the plan and redrew school as-
signment boundaries.80 In addition, “Parent Assistance Centers” were established to
assist parents and students “navigate the school selection and assignment process.”81
Of particular note, both school boards followed a similar process in implement-
ing and adjusting assignment plans. Parental and community opinions were sought
and considered prior to executing changes. The community’s collective desire to
achieve diversity and equality in primary and secondary education was one of the
primary motivations behind the various adjustment plans and continued efforts by
the Boards to refine the plans.
Justice Thomas, supported by a plurality, argued that the school boards have “no
interest in remedying the sundry consequences of prior segregation unrelated to
schooling,”82 but the Court had no interest in these externalities when developing
judicial remedies, and it had no interest in foreclosing local officials from fashioning
remedies themselves.83 Although Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment, he ob-
served that the plurality was mistaken “[t]o the extent the plurality opinion suggests
the Constitution mandates that state and local school authorities must accept the
status quo of racial isolation in schools.”84 Kennedy also nodded to the deferential
treatment of education experts:
If school authorities are concerned that the student-body compo-
sitions of certain schools interfere with the objective of offering an
75 Id.
76 Id. at 814–15.
77 Id. at 816.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 817.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 818.
82 Id. at 760 (Thomas, J., concurring).
83 Id.
84 Id. at 788 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Jordan M. Steiker, Brown’s Descendants,
52 HOW. L.J. 583, 588 (2009).
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equal educational opportunity to all of their students, they are free
to devise race-conscious measures to address the problem in a
general way and without treating each student in different fash-
ion solely on the basis of a systematic, individual typing by race.85
The general rebuke to local control did not go undetected by Justice Breyer’s dissent.
In Parents Involved in Community Schools, Justice Breyer wrote:
[A]s a judge, I do know that the Constitution does not authorize
judges to dictate solutions to . . . problems. Rather, the Consti-
tution creates a democratic political system through which the
people themselves must together find answers. And it is for them
to debate how best to educate the Nation’s children and how best
to administer America’s schools to achieve that aim.86
State constitutions incorporate core goals that protect against government abuses
for minority groups. Thus, the Court should evaluate school reforms under state con-
stitutional standards and accessibility to the political process. The Court needs to
take a backseat to districts implementing innovative, community-supported solutions
to close the achievement gap through addressing the special needs of groups targeted
under the statute. Lawmakers must evaluate education issues through the lens of cir-
cumstances within their local community and then develop practicable solutions.
And so, it seems unfair to pretend as though we have not previously attempted
to knock down the parent participation barrier. Although individual efforts have
been less successful, Congress made efforts to include parents in No Child Left
Behind.87 The following Part reviews state government attempts to implement this
principle of “family engagement.”
2. Federal Mandates: State Obligations Versus Prerogatives for
Parental Involvement
A trickle-down effect occurs when the federal government becomes involved
in public education. And although the federal government attempts to protect the
parents’ role in educating their children, as discussed below, states gravitate to re-
forming education policy to align with federal mandates to receive additional fund-
ing. Family engagement laws and policies in public education seek to encourage the
active participation of families in children’s learning. These provisions facilitate an
atmosphere in which schools and families work together to improve educational
85 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 788–89.
86 Id. at 862 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
87 See 20 U.S.C. § 6318 (2006).
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outcomes.88 No Child Left Behind requires local-educational agencies to create
policies that involve parents at the school level in the work needed to ensure im-
provement and to hold schools accountable.89 But similar to the local control doc-
trine, acknowledged by the Supreme Court, this legislation fails to appreciate the
need to realize this involvement at the school-board level. Working at the school-
board level brings together diverse groups within the district and helps build a co-
hesive plan to improve all schools. Moreover, these federal prescriptions provide
weak consequences for entities unwilling to comply with these requirements.
According to the National PTA, forty jurisdictions “have enacted laws directing
school districts, boards of education, or schools to implement family engagement
policies”;90 eleven states “lack family engagement laws”;91 and at least five states
“have advisory councils . . . with the power to influence policy related to family en-
gagement.”92 Most notably, many states provide for improved communication, advi-
sory councils, parent leadership, and strengthening local control, but very few states
establish accountability and enforcement mechanisms for these participation goals.93
In terms of accountability, a few states consider “family and community involvement”
when accrediting districts and evaluating school principals.94 Only a handful of states—
Florida, Louisiana, and New Mexico—attach sanctions for districts that fail to comply
with “family-school partnerships.”95 These sanctions affect budget approval and pro-
grammatic grants.96
Parental involvement measures vary from state to state. Most states implement
policies that “encourage family engagement through legislation emphasizing public
school policy.”97 For example, Michigan law encourages family engagement by
prompting school districts “to create voluntary contracts between educators and
families” that facilitate familial participation in their children’s education.98 Another
method used to encourage family engagement in public schools is the establishment
of advisory councils.99 Advisory councils can operate at the state or local level or
both.100 Michigan created “school reform boards” that ensure academic objectives
88 See NAT’L PTA, REFERENCE GUIDE: STATE LAWS ON FAMILY ENGAGEMENT IN
EDUCATION 15 (2010) [hereinafter PTA REFERENCE GUIDE], available at http://www.pta.org
/files/State_Laws_Report.pdf.
89 See § 6318.
90 PTA REFERENCE GUIDE, supra note 88, at 15.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 See, e.g., id.
94 Id. at 16.
95 Id. at 17.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 15.
98 Id. at 16.
99 Id. at 15–16.
100 Id. at 16.
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are achieved through various activities and programs.101 Massachusetts’s legislature
has also created advisory councils that operate in conjunction with the State Board
of Education.102 Parents and students may participate on these councils, and state law
mandates that one sitting member of the State Board of Education be an individual
“who represents public school parents.”103
While some states provide incentives for developing engagement policies and
hold school boards accountable for executing these policies,104 other states impose
sanctions.105 States may provide grants and award programs based on different cri-
teria.106 Some states, such as Wisconsin and Minnesota, offer grants for underserved
communities.107 A Wisconsin grant targets school districts in which the majority of
the student populations are low income.108 To receive additional funding, schools are
required to fulfill certain objectives, one of which is the engagement of “students and
families in school decision-making.”109 Other states, including California, Oregon,
and Tennessee, offer grants for resource centers that provide innovative family en-
gagement programs, parenting classes, and family literacy.110
Because an increasing number of American families lack English fluency, a
language barrier may prevent adequate and effective communication between edu-
cators and families.111 However, many states recognize that “failing to engage these
students and their families is both detrimental to student achievement and a lost op-
portunity for increasing English fluency, academic achievement, and civic participa-
tion among these families.”112 Consequently, many states seek strategies to engage
and involve these families in public education policymaking.113
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 17 (noting that Colorado, Wyoming, South Carolina, and Florida all follow this
practice).
105 See id.
106 Id. at 111.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. In Minnesota, grants are offered to schools in which students underperform, in an
effort to provide funds to create programs that will encourage and improve student perfor-
mance. Id. These programs seek to encourage “greater family engagement and the devel-
opment of interventions to help the student succeed.” Id.
110 Id. at 112 (“To qualify [for the Nell Soto Parent/Teacher Involvement Program grant],
a majority of both families and educators must agree to specific terms . . . a majority of
families must sign compacts in which they commit to be involved in their children’s edu-
cation . . . [and] educators must hold community-based meetings at least once a month.”).
111 Id. at 229.
112 Id.
113 See id.
Twenty-one states have enacted legislation that encourages family
engagement among non-English fluent parents: AK, AZ, AR, CA, CT,
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Indiana and Wisconsin adopted such policies.114 Indiana law requires schools
with “bilingual-bicultural programs” to create local advisory committees consisting
of a majority of parents with children eligible to participate in these programs.115
Similarly, Wisconsin law provides for a bilingual-bicultural advisory committee
consisting of “parents of students participating in the . . . programs”116 who are
tasked with the “planning and evaluation of [said] programs.”117
Similarly, Rhode Island and Illinois enacted administrative measures that en-
sure bilingual families’ engagement.118 The former requires that English Language
Learners (ELLs) be included in evaluation of its regulations,119 while the latter es-
tablished a Department of Bilingual Education to focus primarily on “maximiz[ing]
the involvement of bilingual families, teachers, community group representatives,
and other individuals in the creation of departmental policy.”120
A few states also adopted interesting statutes to encourage the participation of
migrant families in education policy. For example, Minnesota law targets the partici-
pation of ELL students in the development of education policy.121 “The law requires
local school districts to seek the views of families about the impact of programs on
their children.”122 The implementation of these policies demonstrate the importance
of “[e]nsur[ing] that all programs serving the ELL community include family and par-
ent input in policymaking as well as in the design, evaluation, and implementation
FL, HI, ID, IL, IN, MA, MN, NE, NJ, NM, NY, NC, RI, UT, WA
and WI.
Thirty states lack specific statutes relevant to non-English fluent
family engagement: AL, CO, DE, DC, GA, IA, KS, KY, LA, ME, MD,
MI, MS, MO, MT, NV, NH, ND, OH, OK, OR, PA, SC, SD, TN, TX,
VT, VA, WV and WY.
At least two states mandate the communication occur including the
creation of literature and printed information, in the family’s native lan-
guage: MA and RI.
At least three states offer specific centers for non-English fluent
parents: CA, NE, and UT.
At least five states include families who lack English fluency in
school policy making: IL, IN, MN, NJ and WI.
Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 229–30.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 230 (“[Illinois] law further requires preference in staff hiring to be given to
individuals who are natives of countries in which the languages included in the educational
programs are spoken.”).
121 Id. at 230.
122 Id.
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of programs.”123 This brief overview demonstrates the varied attempts to involve
parents in public schools. The landscape proves inconsistent in  commitment to the
cause, policy execution, and accountability measures. The next Part discusses how
we reached our current system of layered public-school governance and in turn the
need to reinvigorate the parents’ role.
II. GOVERNMENTAL OBLIGATION VERSUS PARENTAL RIGHTS
Local control must not stop with a school board’s decision. Instead, a court
should explore parents’ and the community’s access to shaping school policy and
reform. As discussed in Part I, No Child Left Behind contains strong parent partici-
pation provisions with absolutely no enforcement mechanisms.124 Moreover, the
pivotal role of school boards magnifies the importance of access prescriptions and
public comment procedures. As federal involvement in public education increases
and states take on a greater role implementing national expectations, the voice of lo-
cal interest struggles to be heard. Fulfilling the noble origins of our public-education
system requires wide political participation from every socioeconomic, racial, and
ethnic affiliation.
A. Understanding the Origins of Local Control and Shared Governance
The common-school ideal, which emerged in the 1840s, envisioned an institu-
tional standard based on universal social principles: responsible citizenship, shared
morals, a national culture, and pathways to economic independence.125 At this point
in our history, centralized state- and federal-level controls over education were non-
existent barriers to the local agenda.126 Education governance enjoyed a measure of
solitary confinement, separate from other functions imposed upon public officials.127
In time, public education reform mushroomed into a complex governance web
that strangled the community voice necessary to accomplish goals sought through
well-intentioned, yet unsuccessful, bureaucratic restructuring and legislation. Local
control gained a negative reputation in mainstream politics during the era of indus-
trialization and growing immigrant populations within urban centers.128 Local con-
trol meant a “decentralized school committee system rooted in ward politics, which
123 Id. at 231.
124 See supra notes 89–96 and accompanying text.
125 KIRST & WIRT, supra note 7, at 6–7.
126 Id. at 8 (“[A]t the state level . . . these generally were bare-bones units with scant
power. . . . But it was not until after the Civil War, in 1867, that Washington created even
a low-level Bureau of Education and gave it the modest chore of collecting education data
and disseminating information about school organization and teaching methods.”).
127 See id. at 6.
128 See id. at 8–9.
1112 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 22:1093
provided extensive opportunities for undue influence as schools sought to cope with
the immigrant waves overwhelming the cities.”129 Wealthy businessmen and educa-
tion professionals extinguished this form of local control by promoting citywide
elections.130 Their seemingly neutered message: “[T]ake education out of politics.”131
They reasoned that “[a] good school system was good for all, not for just one part
of the community.”132 Thus, a centralized board should control public education led
by a superintendent with the professional credentials required to endear a hefty degree
of deference towards his decisions from board members.133
According to its proponents, this new system would create systemic improve-
ments and facilitate accountability.134 However, an inevitable negative side-effect—
which is still felt today—was the exclusion of “everyday” Americans attempting to
participate in the political processes responsible for setting public education norms.135
The connection between education officials and their constituents widened due to
the successful Progressive-Era campaign, which centralized and professionalized
local-education governance.136 These egalitarian goals worked to the disadvantage
of a democratic government enterprise. Influential parents’ groups advocated on
behalf of school boards and their elitist citizen leaders, as opposed to the grassroots
concerns percolating in the margins.137
While the social tide and politically savvy strategies clouded local control’s
reputation at the turn of the century, the Court and Congress necessarily exposed
local misdeeds during the next historical era. For decades, states’ rights activists
staved off federal involvement in public education behind the shield of their Tenth
Amendment interpretations, which placed schools exclusively within the control of
state governments.138 This state choke hold on educational opportunities loosened
129 Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
130 See id. at 10.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 9.
133 Id. at 10.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 10–11 (“The financial and professional leaders who deplored the politics and in-
efficiency of the decentralized ward system had another reason for disliking that arrange-
ment: It empowered members of the lower and lower-middle classes, many of whom were
working-class immigrants. Reformers wanted not simply to replace bad men with good; they
proposed to change the occupational and class origins of the decisionmakers.”).
136 Id. at 11 (“A classic 1927 study showed that upper-class professionals and big business-
men dominated the new centralized boards of education. . . . The new professional and man-
agerial board members delegated many formal powers to school professionals, giving educators
the leeway to shape schools to meet the needs of the new industrial society, at least as defined
by one segment of that society: chiefly prosperous, native-born, Anglo-Saxon Protestants.”).
137 Id. at 12.
138 Id. at 13 (“Opponents had long argued successfully that because the Tenth Amendment
to the Constitution left control of schools to the states, Washington had no constitutionally
defensible role in education.”).
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when the Supreme Court abolished separate-but-equal schools in the South by unani-
mous decision.139 And nearly a decade later, President Lyndon Johnson passed the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA).140 Brown v. Board of Education,141
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,142 and the ESEA143 marked the parameters of acceptable
federal involvement in the states’ educational affairs: providing civil rights protections
and funding for at-risk student populations.144
These concerted acts by federal government branches launched an attack on the
legitimacy of local control in the public education arena, especially in minority com-
munities. Moreover, the mid-1970s “was the peak expansion period for new state
court regulations on local schools, indicating that local schools could not be trusted to
guarantee student rights or due process. The legalization of local education expanded
through state education codes and through lawsuits increasingly directed at local au-
thorities.”145 As a consequence, special interest campaigns became more prevalent.146
And not long after, state agencies began harnessing control of public education.147
Over the past two decades, several reforms in education governance—such as
federal interventions via No Child Left Behind, more stringent state accountability
schemes, shared increases in mayoral control, site-based management, and a rise in
school choice popularity—have forced school boards to settle into an unfamiliarly
weakened authority in relation to directing local policies.148 In the 1990s, the federal
role in public education expanded to holding public educators accountable for stu-
dent achievement outcomes.149 No Child Left Behind invited a new debate regarding
the power balance between local, state, and federal governance for public education.
139 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
140 Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
141 347 U.S. 483.
142 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
143 Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27.
144 See Superfine, supra note 14, at 87–88.
145 KIRST & WIRT, supra note 7, at 14.
146 Id. at 15 (“The national movements behind such programs, moreover, often spawned
new local interest groups on such issues as civil rights, women’s roles, special education,
students’ rights, and ethnic self-determination. . . . Indeed, big-city ‘decentralizers’ sought
to reinstitute something resembling the old ward boards of education abolished at the turn
of the century. They ended up winning partial decentralization through subdistrict board
elections, with tighter oversight of superintendents.”).
147 Id. at 19, 21.
148 Saiger, The Last Wave, supra note 14, at 860, 862 (arguing that legislation on the state
and federal level, along with the charter school movement, effectively “constrain[ed] district
flexibility and ratchet[ed] up their accountability,” as compared to the exclusivity over school
related decisions previously enjoyed by district officials).
149 See id. at 873; Superfine, supra note 14, at 88.
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For parental participation, this legislation still presented hope on the fronts of trans-
parency and due process (the opportunity to be heard).150
Based on the ever-growing federal role in public education, local school boards
are facing an ever-growing deficit in their ability to affect educational policy.151 But
how is local control defined? According to Professor Richard Briffault, “[c]ourts
which have gotten past the simple invocation of the term [local control] generally
present a laundry list of values: parents’ rights, community choice, efficiency and
interlocal competition, educational excellence, accountability, and participatory de-
mocracy all have been proferred as possible explanations.”152 Local control brings
greater attention to the parental voice’s ability to affect community schools, encour-
ages the local media to focus on unique geographical educational concerns, and fos-
ters the hope that everyone will pay greater attention to the local school board’s
ability to effectuate the state and federal policies that we deem important to redirect
the trajectory of public education.153 The following Part sets forth data demonstrat-
ing that parent participation in the political process, a missing link in the legal doc-
trine concerning local control, produces positive educational outcomes for at-risk
and minority students.
B. Why Develop a Protected Space for Parents Through School-Board Actions?
Parental involvement and social factors receive great weight when studying the
predictive factors for student academic achievement. As exhibited in the Memphis
and Shelby County consolidation, detailed below in Part III, suburban parents covet
their ability to exert local control over school politics.154 School-district boundaries
permit these wealthier parents to inculcate themselves from the challenges facing
urban school districts with majority poor and racial minority residents.155 But the
representation of racial and ethnic minorities on local school boards, referred to as
“descriptive representation,” leads to education policies tailored for the specific
150 See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
151 Superfine, supra note 14, at 95–96 (discussing the implementation of federal policy
at the state level, which varies from every jurisdiction, and at the local and school level,
which also varies); see also KIRST & WIRT, supra note 7, at 26.
152 Briffault, supra note 14, at 773.
153 KIRST & WIRT, supra note 7, at 31–32.
154 See Saiger, The Last Wave, supra note 14, at 867.
155 Id. at 923–24 (“Nevertheless, suburban districts, organized to provide education with
only minimal regard for the problems of poor communities, are now being ordered by state
and national administrations—elected with suburban support—to pay heed, and allocate
resources, to the poor and to other minorities within their borders. . . . Suburbanites, the pri-
mary beneficiaries of the status quo, have economic, political, and educational incentives to
preserve both the localism and the publicness of their local, public schools.”).
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challenges facing these groups, referred to as “substantive representation.”156 More
importantly, studies show that these policies may result in improved student perfor-
mance.157 But a token representative, marginalized and alone on a school board, will
not produce these positive outcomes.158
Presently, school boards select their members using three methods: appointments,
at-large elections, and ward elections.159 Studies show differing policy outcomes de-
pending on the type of election employed in a district. A school district with at-large
elections will elect fewer minorities, which results in fewer minority administrative
and teacher hires, more minority students placed in low-status classes, and few mi-
nority students are placed in gifted classes.160 On the other hand, when Hispanics are
a majority in the school district, the hiring results and student placement numbers
are the exact opposite.161 Ward or subdistrict elections produce greater minority rep-
resentation.162 The nonpartisan at-large systems
increase the cost of citizen participation, make the bridge be-
tween representative and citizen more tenuous, and consequently
muffle expression of the full range of political interests within
a community. Those constrained citizens who are affected tend
to be of lower socio-economic status, so that governing struc-
tures are clearly not value free. Rather, these reforms actually
encourage the access and satisfaction of another group, middle-
class and higher-status people.163
156 See ALBERT K. KARNIG & SUSAN WELCH, BLACK REPRESENTATION AND URBAN
POLICY (1980) (study showing that greater black representation on school boards and city
councils resulted in policies more favorable to the interests of this minority group); HANNA
FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967); Belinda I. Reyes & Max
Neiman, System of Elections, Latino Representation, and School Policy in Central California
Schools, in LATINOS AND THE ECONOMY: INTEGRATION AND IMPACT IN SCHOOLS, LABOR
MARKETS, AND BEYOND 37, 38–39 (David L. Leal & Stephen J. Trejo eds., 2011); Kenneth J.
Meier et al., Structural Choices and Representational Biases: The Post-Election Color of
Representation, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 758, 759 (2005); Ross et al., supra note 10, at 72.
157 See Kenneth J. Meier & Eric Gonzalez Juenke, Electoral Structure and the Quality of
Representation on School Boards, in BESIEGED: SCHOOL BOARDS AND THE FUTURE OF
EDUCATION POLITICS 199, 224 (William G. Howell ed., 2005); see also Kenneth J. Meier &
Robert E. England, Black Representation and Educational Policy: Are They Related?, 78 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 392 (1984); Ross et al., supra note 10. But see Fraga & Elis, supra note 10.
158 Meier et al., supra note 156, at 759; Neiman et al., supra note 10, at 25; Reyes &
Neiman, supra note 156, at 47.
159 Meier & England, supra note 157, at 401.
160 KIRST & WIRT, supra note 7, at 110.
161 Id. at 110–11.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 113.
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At-large elections came about as a strategy to remove the political representation
of marginalized groups, such as immigrants and the socioeconomically poor, and to
immunize school boards from undue political influence.164 Even though the malintent
behind at-large elections may have subsided, the intended effect continues to erect
an obstacle for electing black and Latino school-board members. School boards, re-
gardless of the selection method, should act in the best interest of every constituent in
the district, but studies show that the racial and ethnic composition of school boards
are indeed reflected in adopted policies.165 School-board members elected via an at-
large system must appease the majority population, sometimes to the detriment of
their black or Latino supporters, as opposed to ward or single-member districts that
are held accountable by a racial or ethnic group with clearly identifiable interests.166
Local school boards and representative racial balance underwent in-depth study
when the black community gained political clout in certain regions throughout the
country. Over the past decade, social scientists began to also focus on the disparity
between Latino school board representation and the Latino student population. For
example, the Latino student population in Central California increased from 400,000
to 580,000 students between the 1995–1996 and 2003–2004 school years, totaling
forty-nine percent of the student population.167 However, the Latino school board rep-
resentation in this region rose only from 136 to 219 members during the same period
in this region, totaling fifteen percent of all board members.168 Professors Reyes and
Neiman found that Latinos must comprise a supermajority of the student population
in Central California districts before Latino representation will increase on district
school boards.169 Other studies surveying different regions support this conclu-
sion.170 Specific to election methods, Reyes and Neiman concluded (as supported
by other studies involving black and Latino communities) that Latino candidates
164 Neiman et al., supra note 10, at 4. See generally David L. Leal, Valerie Martinez-Ebers
& Kenneth J. Meier, The Politics of Latino Education: The Biases of At-Large Elections, 66
J. POLS. 1224 (2004); Joseph Stewart, Jr., Robert E. England & Kenneth J. Meier, Black
Representation in Urban School Districts: From School Board to Office to Classroom, 42
W. POL. Q. 287 (1989).
165 See generally Judy Brown, Redistricting Single-Member Districts After the 2010
Census: A Common Sense Approach to the Process for Texas Public School Districts, 26
LEGAL DIG. TEX. SCH. ADMIN. 1 (2010).
166 See Meier et al., supra note 156, at 760–61.
167 Reyes & Neiman, supra note 156, at 42–43; see also Neiman et al., supra note 10, at 4
(discussing the 2008–2009 statistics).
168 Neiman et al., supra note 10, at 8 & n.7; Reyes & Neiman, supra note 156, at 43. In
approximately two-thirds of the districts located in Central California, there were no Latino
board members elected during this time period. Id.
169 Reyes & Neiman, supra note 156, at 44.
170 See, e.g., Fraga & Elis, supra note 10, at 670 (whether elected through at-large or a
single-member/ward election, Latinos “were underrepresented in districts where they constituted
less than 50% of the population”); Ross et al., supra note 10, at 82 (studying Texas districts).
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fare better in districts with ward elections as opposed to at-large elections.171 More-
over, once a district elects one Latino board member, the likelihood of electing a
second Latino member to the board greatly increases, which leads to more effective
substantive representation.172
The benefits of descriptive representation on school boards manifest in targeted
policy development and classroom improvements.173 On the policy level, Latino
school-board members perceive the severity of problem areas differently than their
white peers.174 For example, in one study, a majority of white board members ranked
state and federal mandates as a “serious” concern, and fewer than half ranked fund-
ing as a “serious” concern.175 On the other hand, in the same study, only thirty-nine
percent of Latino board members ranked state and federal mandates as a “serious”
concern while sixty-four percent ranked inadequate funding as a “serious” concern.176
In a follow-up report, the researchers showed that Latino board members cited the
following concerns with at least fifteen percent more frequency than their white
peers: curriculum decisions; improving relationships between board members and
administrators; influencing the hiring of principals, teachers, and superintendents;
and improving teacher working conditions.177 With regards to priorities, both white
and Latino board members recognized closing the achievement gap as a top priority;
seventy-one percent of Latino representatives saw “advocating for immigrant stu-
dents” as a high to very high priority as compared to forty-one percent of their white
peers.178 Increasing the number of black and Latino students going to college and in-
creasing school-board representation for people of color was also a greater priority
for Latino respondents as compared to white respondents.179
With regards to student educational outcomes, although only an indirect correla-
tion exists, the data demonstrates that political representation increases bureaucratic
representation, which in turn increases the number of racial and ethnic minority
teachers.180 Latino school board representation correlates with employing a greater
171 Reyes & Neiman, supra note 156, at 44 (“[T]he proportion of Latino board members
increases in jurisdictions that use ward elections. While 32% of at-large district elections
have a Latino on the board, 81% of districts with ward elections have at least one Latino on
the board.”).
172 Id. at 47–49.
173 Id. at 57 (“Insofar as a greater presence of Latino administrators and teachers ulti-
mately produces policies or provides environments that are conducive to improved perfor-
mance among otherwise under-performing students, the system of electing school board
members might be a critical, albeit indirect, factor shaping Latino student performance.”).
174 Neiman et al., supra note 10, at 19–22; Reyes & Neiman, supra note 156, at 53–55.
175 See Reyes & Neiman, supra note 156, at 55 fig.3.8.
176 See id. at 53–55.
177 Neiman et al., supra note 10, at 14.
178 Id. at 23.
179 Id.
180 See Fraga & Elis, supra note 10, at 663; Ross et al., supra note 10, at 83.
1118 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 22:1093
number of Latino and bilingual teachers and Latino administrators.181 This increase
proves especially important in states such as California, where, during the 2004–
2005 school year, 45.9% of Latino students were ELL students, which represented
approximately one-fifth (21.5%) of the total student population, and where 85.3%
of state ELL students were Spanish language speakers.182 A similar correlation was
found when studying black school board representation and an increase in black
administrators.183 Representation at the administrative and teaching levels translates
into educational improvements.184 For Latino students in Texas, an increased propor-
tion of Latino teachers resulted in increased standardized test scores for Latino
students.185 Even though districts with Latino school-board members struggle with
student-teacher ratios and teacher credentials, these numbers improve when Latinos
are represented over a period of time on the district’s board.186
Despite the irrefutable evidence that parent participation and minority member
representation affects student achievement, public education’s burgeoning gover-
nance structure makes quality participation a more difficult task. Each example set
forth in Part III involved a lawsuit. These pleas to the judiciary included allegations
regarding procedural processes. In the education context, these participation defi-
ciencies should also be grounded in the substantive due process right to parent. The
next Part reviews this doctrinal foothold in protecting parents’ influence over their
child’s educational track.
C. The Fundamental Right to Parent
Parents play an influential role in children’s upbringing. Inside the home, parents
are typically the primary source of love, support, and wisdom. However, parental roles
extend beyond the home. Parents possess a legally recognized fundamental right to
direct the education of their children.187 This right affords parents the opportunity
to influence the policies that shape the course of their child’s education. As is the
181 Fraga & Elis, supra note 10, at 672 (finding that increased administrator representation
only occurred in districts with a majority Latino population); Reyes & Neiman, supra note 156,
at 49. See generally Luis Ricardo Fraga, Kenneth J. Meier & Robert E. England, Hispanic
Americans and Educational Policy: Limits to Equal Access, 48 J. POLS. 850 (1986).
182 Fraga & Elis, supra note 10, at 666.
183 See generally Stewart, England & Meier, supra note 164.
184 Ross et al., supra note 10, at 82–84.
185 Id. at 84 (“In sum, the findings for Texas school districts demonstrate descriptive rep-
resentation . . . has a powerful (albeit largely indirect) effect on substantive policy outcomes
of interest to the Latino community. The election of Latino school board members is signifi-
cantly related to the number of Latino administrators, which is associated with the number of
Latino teachers. In turn, the number of Latino teachers influences Latino student performance.”).
186 Reyes & Neiman, supra note 156, at 49.
187 See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925).
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case of any elected position, board members are selected to serve the needs of the
constituents, essentially placing parents at the forefront of their children’s education.
The Supreme Court most often discusses the parents’ substantive due process
right to direct their child’s education in cases involving First Amendment issues—
the Establishment and Freedom of Expression. In the Court’s education cases in-
volving the Fourteenth Amendment, the school board serves as a surrogate for the
majoritarian parent’s position, and little attention is given to the nuances of school-
board politics. To understand how the fundamental right of parents to control their
child’s education may apply when determining the constitutionality of policies in-
voking the Fourteenth Amendment, fundamental right as set forth under founda-
tional education-law cases is explored below.
Meyer v. Nebraska188 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters189 marked the Court’s entry
into defining the intersection of education and parental rights. More specifically, Pierce
and Meyer allowed the Court to consider the authoritative boundaries for states and
parents in the education context.190 In Meyer, the Court stated that “[c]orresponding
to the right of control, it is the natural duty of the parent to give his children educa-
tion suitable to their station in life.”191 In Pierce, the Court noted that “[t]he child is
not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have
the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations.”192 Later, in Prince v. Massachusetts,193 the Court explained that pa-
rental rights are not without limitation.194 The majority stated that “the family itself
is not beyond regulation in the public interest . . . neither rights of religion nor rights
of parenthood are beyond limitation.”195 These limitations came into question when
the Court considered the ability of Old Order Amish families to remove their chil-
dren from the public school system after the eighth grade.196 In Wisconsin v. Yoder,
the Court expressed that “[t]he history and culture of Western civilization reflect a
strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children.
This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now estab-
lished beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.”197
The Supreme Court most recently confirmed these views in Troxel v. Granville,198
in which it upheld the parents’ right to control their child’s visitation schedule with
188 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
189 Pierce, 268 U.S. 510.
190 See Paula Abrams, The Little Red Schoolhouse: Pierce, State Monopoly of Education
and the Politics of Intolerance, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 61, 72–73 (2003).
191 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400.
192 Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
193 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
194 Id. at 166.
195 Id.
196 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
197 Id. at 232.
198 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion).
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parental grandparents.199 The fundamental right to parent has been most elaborated
on in state court rulings related to home schooling, custody, and visitation.200 Both
federal and state courts have made clear that parents hold the authority to make deci-
sions concerning the “care, custody, and control” of their children, which includes
education.201 The only pathway by which the state could supersede parents’ funda-
mental rights would be in cases where the parents were found unfit, the parents
harmed the health or safety of the child, or the parents’ decisions caused significant
social burdens.202
What does this mean with respect to political activism, representation, and reform
in public education? In a democratic-education system, as envisioned by Professor
Amy Gutmann, public-education policy requires a balance between state authority,
parental rights, and professional educators.203 The intended goal entails “conscious
social reproduction,” where students learn to appreciate diverse notions concerning
life and eventually build the autonomous capacity to choose.204 Moreover, political
majorities should shape policy, except in the limited circumstances of repression
or discrimination.
Liberal democracy theorists debate the proper balance between parents’ right to
control their child’s education, the state’s obligation to mold productive citizens, and
a child’s autonomy.205 These scholars view children as members of their families
199 Id. at 60–63.
200 See, e.g., Ex parte E.R.G. & D.W.G., 73 So. 3d 634 (Ala. 2011) (holding that
grandparent visitation statutes do not comply with the fundamental right to parent); Jonathan
L. v. Superior Court of L.A. Cnty., 165 Cal. App. 4th 1074 (2008) (holding that home
schooling may be prohibited for children allegedly abused at home); Dutkiewicz v.
Dutkiewicz, 957 A.2d 821 (Conn. 2008) (holding that a requirement to attend parent-
education classes does not violate the fundamental right to parent); State v. McDonough, 468
A.2d 977 (Me. 1983) (upholding state-imposed home-schooling requirements); Care & Prot.
of Charles, 504 N.E.2d 592 (Mass. 1987) (holding that home-schooling requirements do not
run counter to the fundamental right to parent); People v. Bennett, 501 N.W.2d 106 (Mich.
1993) (upholding state-imposed home-schooling requirements); In re Kurowski, 20 A.3d 306
(N.H. 2011) (determining rights of divorced parents to choose educational course work for
their child); In re William L., Frank L., & Mark L., 383 A.2d 1228 (Pa. 1978) (holding that
the termination of parental rights for a neglected child does not violate the fundamental right
to parent); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993) (holding that the grandparent
visitation statute violated the fundamental right to parent and the privacy right); Crites v.
Smith, 826 S.W.2d 459 (Tenn. App. 1991) (finding that home-schooling requirements do not
violate the fundamental right to parent); Larson v. Burmaster, 720 N.W.2d 134 (Wis. App.
2006) (holding that summer-homework requirement did not violate the fundamental right to
parent and control child’s education).
201 See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66.
202 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233–34 (1972).
203 AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 42 (1987).
204 Id. at 14.
205 Maxine Eichner, School Surveys and Children’s Education: The Argument for Shared
Authority Between Parents and the State, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 459, 471 (2009).
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and citizens of greater society, which creates a dual role for parents and government
in controlling a child’s educational experience.206 The ability of parents to relinquish
a share of their authority to the state enables our liberal democracy to thrive.207
Scholars who rely too heavily on the political process to redeem the parents’
right to control their child’s education, through school board elections and other po-
litical actors, fail to recognize the limited schooling options available to some parents
and the difficulties attendant to accomplishing reform exclusively through political
action.208 Professor Maxine Eichner argues that
[b]ecause our nation believes that individual liberties are impor-
tant, courts are generally treated as a crucial check on the politi-
cal process, particularly where we are concerned that minority
views may not be zealously guarded. To trust parents’ interests
in educating their children to the process of school board elec-
tions and hearings gives too little protection to these rights.209
The Supreme Court has yet to clarify the line between state and parental authority
over a student’s education.210 Eichner proposes that parents’ rights fall subordinate
to state interests related to “developing civic virtues or autonomy,”211 and the state’s
interests fall subordinate to a “practice related to issues properly considered parental
prerogatives.”212 Providing a quality education through race- and/or socioeconomic-
specific policies seems to fall into both realms, but why is there no mention of parents?
Professor Stephen Gilles, in On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto,213
also discusses the distribution of authority between parents and states in controlling
a child’s education.214 Further, he examines whether the contention should be re-
solved through the political process or as a constitutional question.215 He argues that
206 Id. at 462–63 (arguing that the state must play a role in determining education policy
because state actors “have fewer conflicting incentives to ensure that students develop the
dispositions and skills necessary for citizenship,” “[s]chools . . . are better situated to teach
children to recognize that their own way of life is one among many,” and “some parents will
deliberately seek to keep their children from developing particular civic virtues because they
disagree with them”).
207 Id. at 463.
208 Id. at 461 (critiquing Kathleen Conn, Parents’ Right to Direct Their Children’s
Education and Student Sex Surveys, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 139 (2009)).
209 Eichner, supra note 205, at 465.
210 Id. at 467.
211 Id. at 470.
212 Id.
213 Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
937 (1996).
214 See id.
215 Id. at 947.
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parents hold their child’s best interest in educational achievement, more so than state
actors and other parents; therefore, parents should possess primary educational au-
thority over their children.216 In looking to the political process, Gilles proposes that
majorities will try to impose their values on the next person’s child, and parents
should be able to intervene unless their “choices are unreasonable and hence inim-
ical to the child’s best interest.”217 Professor Gilles concludes that parents should
invoke a First Amendment right to educative free speech, worthy of political speech
constitutional protection, when directing their child’s education.218 But with regard to
their substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, Gilles writes
that “[t]his proposition unmistakably implies that government may not coerce the
choices individuals make within the sphere of protected liberty so long as reasonable
people can disagree about which choice is preferable.”219
III. CONTEMPORARY HURDLES TO PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT
Public schools represent a crucible for varying democratic values to meld in pur-
suit of a singular purpose: preparing future citizens. School-district consolidations,
metro-area districts covering diverse socioeconomic populations, and districts with
large undocumented populations require citizens to quibble over limited resources.
Without a unified vision for a district, conflicts arise when distributing these resources
needed to properly educate and provide programming for different student groups.220
School board politics unearth controversial debates surrounding local control,
resources, and community participation. State-governed school boards also unhinge
the doors on the country’s socioeconomic and cultural divides, most evident in the
public education context. The function of school boards differs greatly from other
elected bodies: ensuring quality education. Attaining this goal on behalf of disad-
vantaged children requires parents to share equal access to local school boards.
Their parents’ voices receiving due recognition reflects the democratic principles
underlying full citizenship.221
The following Parts trace strained relationships and economic circumstances
from around the country that highlight the need to reevaluate the constitutional im-
perative of parents as citizenship brokers on their children’s behalf. In Chicago, Phil-
adelphia, and Orleans Parish, non-elected education officials closed and/or converted
216 Id. at 953, 956 (extending the argument to choosing teachers and viewing parents as
consumers with expertise to demand the best for their child).
217 Id. at 960.
218 Id. at 1033–34.
219 Id. at 1003–04.
220 See Thomas Kleven, Federalizing Public Education, 55 VILL. L. REV. 369, 374–75
(2010).
221 See id. at 371 (arguing that “a social compact arising from and perpetuating power
imbalances is unconscionable and not fully democratic”).
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neighborhood schools without acknowledging parent and community opposition.222
In Memphis, parents negotiated an unprecedented consolidation with Shelby County
public schools.223 In Wake County, socioeconomically disadvantaged parents found
themselves outnumbered when more affluent parents funded the campaigns of candi-
dates willing to overturn their voluntary socioeconomic integration plan.224 In Central
California, members of a rapidly growing Latino immigrant population must send
their children to public schools where Latinos are under-represented on school boards
and many parents lack the status to vote for board members.225 These recent distur-
bances in local public education governance illustrate how current school board
composition and practices threaten the parent’s role as a citizenship broker and, in
turn, the ability of local control to work to the benefit of at-risk students.
A. Executive Domination: Chicago, Philadelphia, and Orleans Parish
Dismal parallels arise when chronicling the school-closure decisions made in
Chicago and Philadelphia during the 2012–2013 academic year: (1) the school boards’
actions disproportionately affect low-income minority families;226 (2) parents and
community members continuously expressed grievances based on the failure of non-
elected school boards to heed their opinions throughout the decision-making pro-
cesses;227 and (3) parents, along with activists, in both cities filed lawsuits alleging
civil rights and procedural violations.228
In July 2013, local-education politics hit the world stage—straight from the pub-
lic schools of Chicago229 to the desk of United Nations officials. The letter, entitled
“Letter of Allegation Regarding the Closing of 49 Public Elementary Schools in
Chicago, Illinois, United States of America,”230 did not lodge complaints about the
222 See infra Part III.A.
223 See infra Part III.B.
224 See infra Part III.C.
225 See infra Part III.D.
226 See Motoko Rich & Jon Hurdle, Rational Decisions and Heartbreak on School Closings,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2013, at A11; Noreen S. Ahmed-Ullah et al., CPS Approves Largest
School Closure in Chicago’s History, CHI. TRIB. (May 23, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune
.com/2013-05-23/news/chi-chicago-school-closings-20130522_1_chicago-teachers-union
-byrd-bennett-one-high-school-program.
227 See Ahmed-Ullah et al., supra note 226.
228 See Kristen A. Graham, Suit: Philly School-Closing Policy an Attempt to “Dismantle
Traditional Public Schools”, PHILLY.COM (June 7, 2012), http://articles.philly.com/2012-06
-07/news/32079824_1_school-closings-charter-schools-new-schools; Press Release, Chic.
Teachers Union, Federal Lawsuits Seek to Halt Closings (May 15, 2013) [hereinafter CTU
Press Release], available at http://www.ctunet.com/blog/federal-lawsuits-seek-to-halt-closings.
229 Highest Ranking Cities, 1790 to 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov
/dataviz/visualizations/007/508.php (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
230 Midwest Coal. for Human Rights, Letter of Allegation Regarding the Closing of
49 Public Elementary Schools in Chicago, Illinois, United States of America (July 24,
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failure of the government entities that typically garner our attention: that is, the fed-
eral government’s inability to reauthorize No Child Left Behind or the state govern-
ment’s inability to distribute public-education funds equally. Instead, the drafters
alleged human-rights violations, in part because parents unsuccessfully sought to
influence the harsh decisions of locally elected and appointed officials that may
jeopardize the prospects that a quality education will be offered to their children.231
According to protesters, in the maze of education governance, local officials shunned
the voice of parents and the community.232
On Wednesday, May 22, 2013, the Chicago Board of Education, which consists
of various professionals appointed by the Mayor,233 voted to close fifty public schools,
forty-nine elementary schools, and one high school within the district.234 This drastic
measure represents the largest “mass school closing” in our nation’s history.235 The
district concentrated on underutilized facilities in an attempt to address its over-
whelming budget deficit.236 However, either by coincidence or intent, these closings
disproportionately affected racial minorities and disabled students: eighty percent
of the displaced students identified as black, but only forty-two percent of the dis-
trict’s total student population identified as black.237 Focusing specifically on school
populations, eighty-seven percent of the closing schools report a majority black stu-
dent body.238 If we look into Chicago’s school-closure history, transfer students and
students currently enrolled in receiving schools face the challenge of attending over-
crowded classrooms due to the school mergers, which impedes their opportunities
for a quality education. And these opportunities seem further depressed by the pros-
pect of transferring to schools with lower student achievement levels than their
original school assignment.
But most disturbing, the Board’s participation procedures seemed to quash the
constitutional right of parents to represent their children’s educational interests
through a deliberative, democratic process. Quite simply, as stated by the Midwest
Coalition for Human Rights, “[t]he right to participate lacks any meaning if the
2013) [hereinafter Letter of Allegation], available at http://llnw.wbez.org/Letter%20of%20
Allegation.pdf.
231 See id. at 9–10.
232 See id. at 10.
233 See Board Bios, CHI. BOARD OF EDUC., http://www.cpsboe.org/bios (last visited Apr. 15,
2014).
234 See Ahmed-Ullah et al., supra note 226.
235 Mary Wisniewski, Chicago Board Approves Largest School Closing, REUTERS (May 22,
2013, 7:36 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/22/us-usa-education-chicago-vote
-idUSBRE94L15P20130522.
236 Id.
237 Letter of Allegation, supra note 230, at 4–5 (citing Alex Keefe, Emanuel: CPS School
Closures ‘Not Taken Lightly’ but Must Be Done, WBEZ 91.5 (Mar. 23, 2013), http://www
.wbez.org/news/emanuel-cps-school-closures-not-taken-lightly-must-be-done-106253).
238 Id. at 4.
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public’s opinion is ignored.”239 Parents protested, to no avail, through demonstrations
at City Hall and more intimately through classroom sit-ins at neighborhood schools.240
According to the Chicago Tribune, “[o]ver 20,000 students, parents, and teachers
voiced opposition in over 30 community sessions before the April school-closing
list was issued. More than 9,000 attended meetings organized by the Chicago Board
of Education in neighborhoods and public hearings by appointed judicial officers.”241
The Chicago Board of Education compounded the difficulties of formal partici-
pation in the deliberation process by implementing unprecedented rules for voicing
public opinion. It limited the number of citizens eligible to speak before the Board
and restricted the number of minutes allowed for individual comment.242 It also
placed strict parameters on reserving these speaking moments—citizens needed to
either register online, call, or make their intentions to comment known in person.243
As aptly noted, “poor and working class citizens who do not own their own personal
computers, or who are not able to access a computer at precisely 8:00 a.m. on the
day of registration” were blocked from the process.244 Such people undoubtedly con-
stitute the parents of poor, minority students in the Chicago area.
In response to the Chicago Board of Education’s actions, the Chicago Teachers
Union decided to sponsor a voter registration and education campaign to eventually
replace the mayor and promote an elected school board.245 Through a more formal pro-
cess, the city impaneled hearing officers to review the school closures.246 This panel
expressed clear reservations with regard to the Board of Education’s suggested school-
closing list.247 Invoking legal action, the Chicago Teachers Union spearheaded the
239 Id. at 9.
240 See id. at 10; see also Kim Geiger, People Protesting Planned School Closings Arrested
at City Hall, CHI. TRIB. (May 20, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-05-20/news
/chi-people-protesting-planned-school-closing-arrested-at-city-hall-201305201_1_chicago
-teachers-union-53-elementary-schools-one-high-school-program.
241 Id. (citing Noreen S. Ahmed-Ullah, At Chicago School Closing Hearings, Crowds
Fade, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 25, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-04-25/news/ct-met
-cps-closing-hearings-20130426_1_schools-chief-barbara-byrd-bennett-final-list-two
-community-meetings).
242 See id.
243 See id.
244 Id. (quoting George N. Schmidt, Kafka on Clark Street, SUBSTANCE NEWS (June 4,
2013), http://www.substancenews.net/articles.php?page=4318).
245 Noreen S. Ahmed-Ullah, Teachers Union to Seek Ouster of Mayor, Other Officials,
CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 15, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-04-15/news/chi-ctu-plans
-election-voter-push-20130415_1_closings-one-high-school-program-chicago-teachers-union.
246 See Chuck Sudo, 10 CPS School Closings Opposed By Hearing Officers, CHICAGOIST
.COM (May 8, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://chicagoist.com/2013/05/08/some_cps_school_closings
_opposed_by.php.
247 Id.
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filing of three lawsuits.248 The federal claims came before a judge beginning July 16,
2013, with a four-day hearing to consider a preliminary injunction.249
On Thursday, March 7, 2013, the Philadelphia School Reform Committee voted
to close twenty-three public schools.250 Similar to Chicago, the Board cited underuti-
lization and a need to address its budget deficit as reasons for the excruciating and dif-
ficult decision.251 Also, like Chicago, the people protested to no avail.252 The School
Reform Committee removed only four schools from the closure list after absorbing
pointed accounts from concerned parents and community members.253 In additional
daunting similarity, the demographic characteristics of displaced students facing
these challenges in Philadelphia rang eerily similar to the students facing these chal-
lenges in Chicago,254 and their parents faced the same political hurdles to combat
mandates imposed by unelected officials working to correct local problems without
local input. According to one journalist’s research:
In Philadelphia, black students comprise 81 percent of those who
will be impacted by the closings despite accounting for just 58
percent of the overall student population. In stark contrast, just
4 percent of those affected are white kids who make up 14 per-
cent of Philly students. And though they make up 81 percent of
Philadelphia students, 93 percent of kids affected by the closings
are low-income.255
The school-closure decisions came courtesy of a non-elected body appointed at the
state level because Pennsylvania took control of Philadelphia schools nearly a de-
cade ago.256 And finally, not unlike Chicago, the judiciary has found itself fielding
lawsuits based on civil-rights and procedural violations.257
248 Noreen S. Ahmed-Ullah, Hearings Today on Lawsuits Against CPS School Closings,
CHI. TRIB. (July 16, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-07-16/news/ct-met-cps
-federal-hearing-20130715_1_closings-today-chicago-teachers-union.
249 See id.
250 Jon Hurdle, Philadelphia Officials Vote to Close 23 Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2013,
at A16.
251 Id.
252 See id.
253 See id.
254 See id. (noting that the majority of students in urban schools are either black or Hispanic).
255 Rania Khalek, Philadelphia Is Closing 23 Schools While Building a $400 Million
Prison, RANIAKHALEK.COM (June 5, 2013), http://raniakhalek.com/2013/06/05/philadelphia
-is-closing-23-schools-while-building-a-400-million-prison/.
256 See Mike Dunn, Lawmakers Debate Whether Phila. School Board Should Be Returned
to Local Control, CBS PHILLY (June 3, 2013, 11:52 AM), http://philadelphia.cbslocal.com
/2013/06/03/lawmakers-debate-whether-phila-school-board-should-be-returned-to-local-control/.
257 See Graham, supra note 228.
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While Chicago activists called on the United Nations to intervene, national activ-
ists called on Arne Duncan, the Secretary of the Department of Education, to intervene
on behalf of these Philadelphian students.258 The letter points to the disproportionate
effect of these school closures on black students, ELL students, and students from
poor families.259 The letter also implores the federal government to heed the people’s
request to help fund public education instead of other public works projects, such
as new prisons.260
The post–Hurricane Katrina governance reform of Orleans Parish public schools
also provides a striking example of how parents can be thrust into the backseat of
controlling their child’s education. Professor Robert Garda recounts the New Orleans
story in his article, The Politics of Education Reform: Lessons from New Orleans,
which reveals how splintered and layered governance schemes smother parents while
accomplishing inconclusive achievement gains for students.261 For years prior to
Hurricane Katrina, the Orleans Parish School Board experienced a turbulent rela-
tionship with the state government. The local school board steadily battled against
state takeovers and the opening of charter schools to compete with traditional public
institutions.262 After Hurricane Katrina, the Orleans Parish School Board could not
afford to reopen its public schools.263 This created a justifiable space for long-time
Orleans Parish School Board opponents to seek federal funds allocated exclusively
for charter schools in the district and for the state to take more control from the local
school board.264 Local control advocates, predominately representing the black com-
munity, argued that the federal government’s choice agenda, the state, and national
258 See Letter from Randi Weingarten, President, Am. Fed’n of Teachers, & Diane Ravitch,
Historian, N.Y.U., to Arne Duncan, U.S. Sec’y of Educ. (June 28, 2013), available at http://
www.aft.org/newspubs/press/ltr_secyduncan062813.cfm.
259 Id.
260 Id.
261 Robert Garda, The Politics of Education Reform: Lessons from New Orleans, 40 J.L.
& EDUC. 57, 58–59 (2011). Professor Kristi L. Bowman provides an in-depth analysis of the
Michigan experience with state intervention with affairs typically reserved for the local
school district, observing the challenges associated with such action. See Kristi L. Bowman,
State Takeovers of School Districts and Related Litigation: Michigan as a Case Study, 45
URB. LAW. 1 (2013).
262 See Garda, supra note 261, at 59–66 (describing the contentious political relationship
during the pre-Katrina era between the state, school-board members, community leaders, and
union members regarding legislative bills that allowed for state takeovers for failing schools
and the creation of charter schools).
263 See id. at 67.
264 Id. at 67–68. Garda proposes that “[c]harter schools were adopted not because of supe-
rior educational performance, which was and is still uncertain, but because it was politically
and financially expedient.” Id. at 69. He further argues that “[k]nowing that the OPSB could
not re-open a sufficient number of schools and that charter schools alone could not fill the
gap, Governor Blanco seized the opportunity for state takeover of the schools.” Id. at 70; see
also Saiger, The Last Wave, supra note 14, at 886 (discussing the state takeover of the New
Orleans schools in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina).
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special-interest groups, effectively silenced the voice of parents and stole power
away from local citizens.265 In the end, the Orleans Parish schools were divided and
directly controlled by the local school board, a state school board, or private charter
school operators.266
The closest semblance of an expanded local control to include parents would be
to enroll children in charter schools or one of the few schools operated by the local
school board. But neither option provides for the robust, inclusive community voice
necessary to achieve the goals sought through a unified local governance authority.
If one were to apply the goals illuminated through a liberal democracy, parents and
government may share authority for the schools remaining under the local school
board’s control, but only the highest-achieving schools would remain under this um-
brella.267 These schools are not attended by a representative population of the dis-
trict. For charter schools, parents may exercise great control over education decisions
through choice, but the citizens’ voice seems constrained by the wholly decentralized
governance scheme, and disadvantaged parents may not hold the wherewithal to
truly realize their first choice of schools.268
B. Consolidation of School Districts: The City of Memphis and
Shelby County Merger
The school-district merger between the City of Memphis and Shelby County
was the largest in American history and created a series of challenging transitions.269
The school districts immediately reconciled glaring administrative differences, such
as teachers’ unions, the management of transportation, textbook choices, and eval-
uation systems.270 However, the major rub may lie in reconciling the fissures along
race and class lines. Beyond logistical challenges, lower-income minority parents
must begin brokering the citizenship priorities owed to their children against a large
constituency of suburban parents that fiercely opposed the consolidation.271
265 See Garda, supra note 261, at 71, 84.
266 See id. at 76; see also Saiger, The Last Wave, supra note 14, at 887–88 (explaining in
detail the statutory and governance structure established after the state takeover of the Orleans
Parish schools).
267 See Garda, supra note 261, at 76–77.
268 Id. at 89 (“Enrollment barriers such as lack of information, complex enrollment proce-
dures, and selective admission schools play a major role in the balkanization of New Orleans’
schools. . . . School choice, it seems, is reserved for well-informed, motivated parents with the
time and resources to navigate the complex information gathering and registration process.”).
269 Sam Dillon, Merger of Memphis and County School Districts Revives Race and Class
Challenges, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2011, at A18.
270 Id. (“Memphis teachers are unionized, Shelby County’s are not; the county owns its
yellow buses, the city relies on a contractor; and the two districts use different textbooks and
different systems to evaluate teachers.”).
271 Id.
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The racial tension revolving around schooling in Memphis dates back to the
1960s. Back then, similar to people in other Southern pockets, white families moved
to the suburbs or enrolled their children in private schools, to avoid school integra-
tion.272 This resulted in an urban-school system servicing a vast majority of black
students and a suburban school system servicing primarily white students.273 Eighty-
five percent of students in Memphis, as compared to only thirty-eight percent in
Shelby County, identify as black.274 The Memphis suburbs have experienced greater
diversity as middle-class black families move out of the central city, but the Shelby
County School Board regularly consists of all white members, and the area remains
mostly segregated by race.275 The two districts also service families from different
socioeconomic backgrounds, which is reflected in public school funding. The average
family in Memphis earns $32,000 per year, compared to the suburban family’s aver-
age earnings of $92,000 per year.276 Consequently, the Shelby County’s 2010–2011
school budget totaled around $363 million for 47,000 students.277 Memphis City’s
school budget totaled approximately $890 million for 103,000 students.278 Even with
the merger, advocates remain skeptical that the race and socioeconomic demograph-
ics will change because the district assigns students “to neighborhood schools and
housing tends to be segregated.”279
Tennessee administers three different types of public school systems: county
school districts, special school districts, and municipal school districts. In 1982,
Tennessee outlawed the creation of special school districts.280 City governments
manage and fund municipal school districts.281 Abolished municipal school districts
become subsumed by the county, which holds the legal responsibility for providing
a public education to all students residing within its borders.282
For more than ten years, Shelby County schools repeatedly petitioned the leg-
islature to lift the ban on forming special districts.283 The schools wanted to become
a special school district to gain greater financial independence, set permanent bound-
aries, and prevent consolidation with the Memphis City Schools.284 The Memphis
272 Adrian Sainz, In Memphis, Old Strife Heats up over Schools, Race, FOXNEWS (Feb. 21,
2011), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/02/21/memphis-old-strife-heats-schools-race/.
273 Id.
274 Dillon, supra note 269.
275 Id.
276 Id.
277 Sainz, supra note 272.
278 Id.
279 Dillon, supra note 269.
280 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-2-501(b) (2013).
281 Id. § 49-2-402.
282 See id. § 49-2-1002(d).
283 See Campbell Robertson, Memphis Votes for County to Run Schools, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 9, 2011, at A16.
284 See id.
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City Schools objected to lifting the ban because a status change would have resulted
in substantial revenue losses for the Memphis school district.285
In November 2010, the Republican Party gained a majority in the state legisla-
ture, after which the Shelby County Schools once again sought to become a special
district.286 In response to Shelby County Schools’ efforts to pursue special district
status, the Memphis City Schools introduced a resolution to surrender the district’s
charter and hand control over to the county.287 The Memphis City Board passed this
resolution and agreed to place the question before the local electorate.288 The sur-
render of the charter gained wide support from Memphis citizens.289 The City’s de-
fensive action provided cover against Shelby County drawing a boundary around its
schools, resulting in the taking of approximately $100 million a year from Memphis’s
already underfunded public schools.290 Many Memphis City school students felt that
the merger will also provide better educational opportunities for Memphis students.291
After the resolution passed and a referendum appeared inevitable, State Senator
Norris-Todd introduced “Senate Bill 25” to address the consolidation issue.292 The
bill also called for a three-year transition period, with a planning commission com-
posed of twenty-one members.293 In addition, the bill contained a provision permit-
ting the creation of one or more special districts.294 The same day Norris-Todd filed
the bill, “the group Citizens for Better Education and two individuals filed suit in
Chancery Court . . . seeking a court order directing the Shelby County Election
Commission to put a charter surrender referendum on the ballot and set a date for
the election.”295 Litigation involving consolidation of the school boards ultimately
285 See id.
286 See Sainz, supra note 272.
287 See Christina Samuels, Memphis School Board to Allow Consolidation Vote, EDUC.
WEEK (Dec. 21, 2010, 5:20 PM), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/District_Dossier/2010/12
/memphis_school_board_to_allow.html.
288 See id.
289 See, e.g., Jamel Major, Pastors Announce Support for MCS Charter Surrender, WLOX
.COM (Feb. 18, 2011, 4:53 PM), http://www.wlox.com/story/14059491/pastors-announce
-support-for-mcs-charter-surrender.
290 See Sainz, supra note 272.
291 See, e.g., id.
292 Press Release, Shelby Cnty. Mayor’s Office, Mayor Luttrell Supporting State Law-
makers’ Effort to Ensure Orderly Transition of Schools (Feb. 3, 2011), available at http://
shelbycountytn.gov/index.aspx?NID=1399.
293 Id.
294 Jackson Baker, Haslam Signs SB25, the Norris-Todd Bill, MEMPHIS FLYER (Feb. 11,
2011, 1:36 PM), http://www.memphisflyer.com/JacksonBaker/archives/2011/02/11/haslam
-signs-sb25-the-norris-todd-bill.
295 Bill Dries, Lawsuit Filed as Norris Submits Legislation in Schools Standoff, MEMPHIS
DAILY NEWS (Jan. 13, 2011), http://www.memphisdailynews.com/news/2011/jan/13/lawsuit
-filed-as-norris-submits-legislation-in-schools-standoff.
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boiled down to two constitutional questions involving the decision of Memphis City
schools to surrender its charter and certain provisions in the Norris-Todd bill.296
Federal District Judge Hardy Mays affirmed the constitutionality of both the
Board’s surrender and the Norris-Todd bill.297 But most importantly, Judge Mays
deemed the then-current Shelby County Board unconstitutional because it included
no Memphis residents and ruled that school authorities needed to gather the neces-
sary information for a plan to ensure the rights and privileges of Memphis City
teachers during the transition.298
Following the court’s ruling, both boards met and voted to approve the settle-
ment agreement.299 The Memphis City School Board appointed five representatives
to the twenty-one member transition commission responsible for making recommen-
dations on the consolidation.300 In the interim, a twenty-three member unified board,
including Memphis City Schools members, will operate the schools.301
C. Wealth Disparities and Political Representation: The Wake County Saga
The Wake County experience with a voluntary student-assignment policy based
on socioeconomic status highlights how public opinion shifts and how local school
politics directly affects school policies. As trailblazers, in 2000, Wake County’s school
board implemented an income-based integration plan as an alternative to using race.302
Nearly ten years later, and after measured success integrating students, voters elected
a majority of school-board members intent on eliminating the plan.303 On March 23,
2010, the Wake County School Board voted five-to-four to end the socioeconomic
296 Jackson Baker, Judge Mays Rules!: It’s Basically Norris-Todd as MCS-SCS School
Merger Goes Through, MEMPHIS FLYER (Aug. 8, 2011, 3:30 PM), http://www.memphisflyer
.com/jacksonbaker/archives/2011/08/08/judge-mays-rules-its-norris-todd-as-mcs-scs-school
-merger-goes-through.
297 Id. However, Judge Mays did decline to rule on the future enabling of new, special
school districts. Id. The transfer of control was set to begin during the 2013–2014 school year
with the complete dissolution anticipated for August 2014. Id.
298 Zack McMillin, Judge in Merger Suit Rules Memphis City Schools Will ‘Cease to
Exist’ in 2013, COM. APPEAL (Aug. 8, 2011, 2:52 PM), http://www.commercialappeal.com
/news/2011/aug/08/judge-merger-suit-rules-memphis-city-schools-will/.
299 Bill Dries, Two School Boards Approve Consolidation Court Settlement, MEMPHIS DAILY
NEWS (Aug. 26, 2011), http://www.memphisdailynews.com/news/2011/aug/26/two-school
-boards-approve-consolidation-court-settlement/.
300 Id.
301 Zack McMillin & Jane Roberts, Shelby County, Memphis School Boards Unanimously
OK Merger Deal, COM. APPEAL (Aug. 25, 2011, 2:02 PM), http://www.commercialappeal
.com/news/2011/aug/25/shelby-county-schools-board-approves-merger-deal?print=1.
302 Stacy Teicher Khadaroo, Busing to End in Wake County, N.C. Goodbye, School
Diversity?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 24, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/usa/edu
cation/2010/0324/busing-to-end-in-wake-county-n.c.-goodbye-school-diversity.
303 Id.
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busing policy and to develop attendance zones closer to students’ homes.304 The new
board members, elected to form a majority for replacing the integration plan, received
campaign support from a strong parent coalition.305
Education reforms, whether achieved through litigation or policy, require
community engagement for sustainability.306 The level of community involvement
occurring after the election and before the vote to end socioeconomic diversity led one
group to file a lawsuit alleging open meetings violations.307 In 2010, after the Board’s
meetings generated public attention and desire to attend, it enacted a policy of issuing
tickets to attend the Board meeting in order to limit the anticipated crowd, and it began
to broadcast the meetings live through cable television and the internet.308 On July 20,
2010, around 1,000 people, including the state NAACP, local churches, student groups,
and civil-rights organizations, rallied in downtown Raleigh streets to fight the new
assignment plan.309 The supporters and opponents of the Wake County School Board
majority held a march on the same day by lining up to get the ticket to attend the
school-board meeting.310
Wake County and the State of North Carolina filed a lawsuit against the school
board, claiming that the meeting attendance policy was illegal because citizens had
the right to attend those meetings.311 The court held that the measures that the Board
provided for public access to its meeting in this case were proper under state law,
which required the Board “to take reasonable measures to provide for public access
to its meetings.”312 The court further held that the underlying purpose for the new
policy was “[t]he maintenance of safety and security for members of the public,
members of the Board, staff and the press,”313 and it was “reasonable.”314 However,
the court held that “[a] ticketing procedure requiring a ticket holder to remain on the
premises for hours preceding a meeting,”315 the “[c]omplete exclusion of members
304 Id.
305 T. Keung Hui et al., NAACP Takes Wake to Feds, NEWSOBSERVER.COM (Sept. 26,
2010), http://www.newsobserver.com/2010/09/26/703383/naacp-takes-wake-to-feds.html.
306 See generally Amanda R. Broun & Wendy D. Puriefoy, Public Engagement in School
Reform: Building Public Responsibility for Public Education, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 217 (2008).
307 Bob Geary, Does “Open Meetings” Law Mean Wake School Board Meetings Must Be
Open?, INDY WEEK (May 6, 2010, 1:13 PM), http://www.indyweek.com/citizen/archives/2010
/05/06/does-open-meetings-law-mean-wake-school-board-meetings-must-be-open.
308 See T. Keung Hui, Wake to Require Tickets to Watch School Board Meeting, NEWS
OBSERVER.COM (Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.newsobserver.com/2010/03/22/402420/wake
-to-require-tickets-to-watch.html.
309 See Wake Schools Diversity-Policy Supporters Rally in Raleigh, WRAL.COM (July 20,
2010), http://www.wral.com/news/education/story/7994560/.
310 See Geary, supra note 307 (suggesting the difficulty of obtaining a ticket).
311 See Garlock v. Wake Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 712 S.E.2d 158 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011).
312 Id. at 174 (citation omitted).
313 Id. at 164.
314 Id.
315 Id. at 175.
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of the public from meetings of the COW prior to the meeting,”316 and the failure “to
make accommodations for members of the public who are disabled [are] unreason-
able.”317 Even so, the court held that “[t]here are no grounds in law to invalidate any
action of the Board.”318
The NAACP’s complaint alleged that “[t]he Board was implementing the will
of a well-organized and vocal set of parents who want to live in racially-isolated
neighborhoods and send their children to racially-isolated schools.”319 Parents op-
posing the plan argued that “busing for the purpose of economic diversity poses an
unfair burden on families, in terms of costs to the district and in time that children
could spend on learning rather than being transported.”320
The buzz surrounding the Wake Board of Commissioners’ elections, held shortly
after the Board decision, focused on the candidates’ positions on the community
school policy. For the most part, the candidates’ opinions divided along party lines:
Republicans supported the Board vote and Democrats supported the socioeconomic
integration plan.321 However, one Republican candidate expressed concerns about
“the way the school board majority pushed through the assignment change with little
regard for community comment or influence.”322 Another Republican candidate, also
focusing on inclusion, stated that he did not “think it [was a] good idea to substitute
one set of dissatisfied parents with another set of dissatisfied parents.”323
The newly elected Wake County School Board adopted a neighborhood school
plan instead.324 The socioeconomic integration plan attempted to create a sixty-forty
ratio of students not requiring subsidized lunches and students requiring subsidized
lunches, respectively.325 The suggested replacement policies sparked heated public
discussion.326 The Board approved the Wake School Choice Plan on October 18, 2011,
by a six-to-two vote.327 Gary Joyner, Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce’s Board
316 Id.
317 Id.
318 Id. at 164.
319 Hui et al., supra note 305 (quoting the NAACP complaint).
320 Khadaroo, supra note 302.
321 See, e.g., Ned Barnett, NC: Wake Commission Candidates’ Stands on Schools Will Be
Key on Election Day, AM. INDEP. (Oct. 19, 2010, 2:48 PM), http://www.americanindependent
.com/149927/nc-wake-commission-candidates-stands-on-schools-will-be-key-on-election
-day (summarizing eight candidates’ stances “on the question of neighborhood schools”).
322 Id. (quoting Republican Joe Bryan).
323 Id. (quoting Republican Tony Gurley).
324 See Michael Winerip, Seeking Integration, Whatever the Path, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28,
2011, at A11.
325 Id.
326 See id. (comparing meetings to “a Cartoon Network” special).
327 Odile Fredericks, Wake School Board Adopts Choice-Based Student Assignment Plan,
CAROLINA PARENT (Oct. 19, 2011), http://www.carolinaparent.com/articlemain.php?wake
-school-board-adopts-choice-based-student-assignment-plan-3069.
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of Directors, commented that “[t]he mix of students this plan cares about most is a
mix that provides every child with an opportunity to succeed and schools staffed by
excellent principals and strong teachers,”328 and student achievement, together with
stability, proximity, and choice, are the plan’s proxy for diversity.329 This “new par-
adigm of choice” did not directly resolve the diversity question, which is the main
topic in this battle.330 Opponents said that it would cause racial “segregation” and
“high-poverty” in certain schools because, in Wake County, the neighborhoods were
“still mostly defined by race and socioeconomic status,”331 which may negatively
affect children.332
The NAACP filed a civil-rights lawsuit against the school board on the grounds
that an estimated seven-hundred initial student transfers increased racial segregation,
which violated the prohibition of using federal funds for a discriminatory purpose.333
On January 25, 2012, the Wake Education Partnership reported that “the district would
immediately have more than two dozen high-poverty, low-performing schools if the
new student-assignment policy were to be solely based on the neighborhoods stu-
dents live in.”334 Professor Richard D. Kahlenberg, a leading researcher and com-
mentator on socioeconomic integration, expressed the same concerns.335
D. The Immigrant Voice
For many immigrant parents, their initiation into and only engagement in U.S.
politics stems from their participation in the public education system.336 Veronica
Velez intuitively argues that
[a]s Latinas/os rapidly become the majority in California’s pub-
lic schools, finding ways to increase the Latina/o parental voice
328 Wake School Board Members Open to ‘School Choice’ Plan, WRAL.COM (Feb. 11,
2011), http://www.wral.com/news/education/wake_county_schools/story/9101385/.
329 Id.
330 Bob Geary, Choice Plan Offers a Way Forward in Wake Schools Debate, INDY WEEK
(Feb. 16, 2011), http://www.indyweek.com/indyweek/choice-plan-offers-a-way-forward-in
-wake-schools-debate/content?oid=2032476&mode=print.
331 Stephanie McCrummen, Republican School Board in N.C. Backed by Tea Party Abolishes
Integration Policy, WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2011, 12:38 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com
/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/11/AR2011011107063.html.
332 See, e.g., Press Release, NAACP, N.C. State Conference, Statement by Rev. Dr. William
J. Barber II (Oct. 30, 2009) (“When children are packed into the most underfunded, most seg-
regated, most high-poverty schools, it is nothing but a form of institutionalized child abuse.”).
333 See McCrummen, supra note 331.
334 Dakarai I. Aarons, N.C. District Moves Away from Promoting Diversity, EDUC. WEEK,
Apr. 7, 2010, at 3.
335 See id.
336 See John Rogers et al., Civic Lessons: Public Schools and the Civic Development of
Undocumented Students and Parents, 3 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 201, 202–03 (2008).
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in school and civic reform is not only important, but essential to
(1) better serve the needs of Latina/o students and their families,
and (2) create democratic collaborations among schools and
their communities for the purpose of improving the educational
outcomes of Latina/o children.337
Children born to immigrant parents, even those with citizenship status, experience
detrimental cultural, legal, and policy exclusions.338 These students’ lack of access
to government-sponsored health and education programs jeopardizes their equal op-
portunity to ascend the social ladder. According to a recent study, “[o]nly 37 percent
of Latino children with immigrant parents and 42 percent of Latino children with U.S.-
born parents are enrolled in early education programs.”339 Although some states—even
in the Deep South—attempt to combat these statistics, others remain complacent.340
And the immigrant issue does not apply only to Latina/o parents, especially with re-
gards to socioeconomic status and its known effects on education achievement.341
Undocumented parents engage most through speaking with their children’s
teachers and administrators and by participating in the Parent-Teacher Association
and other school meetings.342 Although these acts may seem small in scale, these
activities allow undocumented parents to understand public institutions and build
a network of other parents sharing similar concerns.343 Vote dilution as a product of
at-large school board elections represents a historical problem in places in the Deep
South, where civil-rights groups have asked courts to dismantle these systems and
draw smaller districts.344 Immigrant parents currently find themselves engaged in a
similar civil-rights struggle. California provides a poignant example of these parents’
legal-advocacy efforts.
At-large elections in many California districts present a political representation
issue for the Latina/o community. Around ninety percent of the state’s school boards
use at-large voting, in addition to many city councils and other local boards.345 The
337 Veronica Nelly Velez, Challenging Lies LatCrit Style: A Critical Race Reflection of
an Ally to Latina/o Immigrant Parent Leaders, 4 FIU L. REV. 119, 143 (2008).
338 See id. at 122.
339 Esther Yu-Hsi Lee, How the Immigration Status of Latino Parents Impacts Their Kid’s
Health and Education, THINK PROGRESS (July 24, 2013, 1:58 PM), http://thinkprogress.org
/immigration/2013/07/24/2343281/immigrant-children-health-academic-success/.
340 See id. (discussing Texas and Alabama).
341 See id.
342 Rogers et al., supra note 336, at 212.
343 Id. at 213.
344 See generally Ross J. Adams, Whose Vote Counts? Minority Vote Dilution and Election
Rights, 35 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 219 (1989) (analyzing vote dilution in a number
of political bodies, including school boards).
345 Mitchell Landsberg, Making Sure Minorities’ Votes Count, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009,
at B1, B10.
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California Voting Rights Act has sought to remedy this issue where plaintiffs dem-
onstrate that an at-large system impairs the ability of a minority group to influence
the outcome of an election.346
Some areas, such as the Madera Unified School District, are more than eighty-
percent Latino, yet only one Latino serves on the school board.347 In September 2009,
the Madera County Superior Court invalidated the results of the November 2008
school-board elections.348 The judge ruled that the at-large system violated the Cali-
fornia Voting Rights Act and required the district to be divided into seven trustee
areas, with candidates to run in each.349 This case followed a similar ruling in Modesto,
California, and twenty-four other districts received letters from the Lawyers’ Commit-
tee who sued Modesto, warning them that their current systems were in violation.350
This caused several districts to examine their racial demographics to determine
whether minority communities were under-represented in school board elections.351
One of these districts, Riverside County, passed the proposal of such a study with a
six-to-three vote.352 Fresno County also found that twenty-eight districts were not in
compliance and made plans to have all of those districts change their voting systems.353
The Lawyers’ Committee put Santa Clara on notice because it has an all-white City
Council, despite the significant percentage of Latinos and Asians in the city.354 Other
places, such as Tulare, settled and agreed to move to district-based voting systems.355
Places that have not as readily made plans to overview their systems are being sued.356
IV. PUTTING THEORY INTO ACTION: APPLYING PARTICIPATORY STANDARDS TO
CURRENT CHALLENGES AND LOOKING FORWARD
School closures, consolidations, and disputes surrounding local politics wreak
upheaval on the community, typically resulting in disproportionate adverse effects
346 Id.
347 Id. at B10.
348 Id. at B1.
349 Id.
350 Id. at B10.
351 Leslie Parrilla, School Boards Study Voting Demographics, PRESS-ENTERPRISE, May 29,
2010, at A1.
352 Id.
353 Id.
354 Lisa Fernandez, Santa Clara Threatened with Lawsuit over Lack of Minorities on City
Council, CONTRA COSTA TIMES (June 9, 2011, 4:19 PM), http://www.contracostatimes.com
/ci_18241572#.
355 See Mike Hazelwood, Residents Sue Tulare’s Hospital District, TULARE ADVANCE-
REGISTER, Aug. 14, 2007; Press Release, Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights of the S.F. Bay
Area, City of Tulare Prepares for Switch to District-Based Election System (Mar. 22, 2011),
available at http://www.lccr.com/pdf/3.22.11Tulare_CVRA_Pressrelease.pdf.
356 See, e.g., Fernandez, supra note 354.
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on low-income and minority residents. Wake County parents felt disempowered
when they were not able to afford a school board that would preserve socioeconomic
integration plans.357 And Memphis parents must have felt leery about joining forces
with parents who vehemently contested comingling urban and suburban resources.358
Moreover, Chicago and Philadelphia parents took to the streets with national power-
houses to avoid their children walking through gang territory, and the cities patron-
ized their requests without giving their voices due regard.359
In these difficult financial times for government institutions, school-district
consolidations provide an additional example of how marginalized groups may find
themselves excluded from larger reform questions and political participation at the
local level. In Tennessee, budgets exacerbate race conflicts.360 Beyond the adminis-
trative hassles, parents from different socioeconomic and racial backgrounds will
need to come together to support the students in this newly formed district. If par-
ents with limited resources face inevitable battles to secure their children’s future,
then the system should respond on a procedural level. Federal courts must recognize
that parents in Chicago, Philadelphia, and California, based on their substantive due
process right to parent, require access to the local political machine that shapes their
children’s opportunities as productive citizens. Lower-income minority parents must
begin brokering the citizenship priorities owed to their children against a large con-
stituency of suburban parents who fiercely oppose consolidation. The community
must bridge the differences between race and socioeconomic classes.
These examples point to disappointing conclusions. Undocumented parents face
the threat of exclusion in the political process of school-board elections because they
lack the right to vote in elections. Poor parents face the threat of exclusion in the po-
litical process because they cannot afford the electoral campaigns necessary to place
their candidate on the ballot; in other instances, they cannot afford the grassroots
efforts necessary to overcome centralized governance. Therefore, in addition to rec-
ognizing quality education as a government interest, the Supreme Court should also
consider the political processes underlying the adoption of education reforms.
Specific to public education, reasonable people may most readily voice their
concerns through their local school board. The Voting Rights Act,361 as interpreted
by the Supreme Court in White v. Regester362 and Thornburg v. Gingles,363 contem-
plates the meaningful representation of minority groups.364 But representation alone
357 See supra Part III.C.
358 See supra notes 272–79 and accompanying text.
359 See supra notes 250–57 and accompanying text.
360 See supra notes 276–79 and accompanying text.
361 Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965).
362 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
363 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
364 Id. at 80 (determining that drawing multi-member versus single-member districts im-
permissibly discriminated against black voters); White, 412 U.S. at 765 (upholding the lower
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does not guarantee access to decision-making processes that affect the quality of
education provided in public schools. Professor Rebecca Brown argues that “a long
and consistent practice of the Supreme Court supports indirect judicial supervision
of legislative functions through scrutinization of resulting legislation for evidence
of malfunction or structural compromise.”365 She observes that, in order to achieve
this goal, the Court aggressively interprets “substantive constitutional standards that
are within its sphere of enforcement, such as individual rights provisions.”366 In ex-
amining the justifications for majority rule, Brown notes that each incorporates an
assumption of equality between citizens participating in the process.367 To fulfill this
equality norm requires more than access to the polls or simply not acting to harm
minority group members; instead, “the deliberative-democracy model recognizes the
same essential place for consultation and persuasion in the making of law that ap-
pears to be included in the minimal constitutional principle of equal participation
reflected in the Supreme Court’s vote-dilution and equal protection decisions.”368
Therefore, constitutional political access includes “an entitlement to both fair par-
ticipation in the process of selecting representatives and the opportunity to influence
the decisions and positions of representatives once they are elected.”369
In Federalism All the Way Down,370 Professor Heather Gerken argues that viewing
“federalism without sovereignty” allows us to consider special purpose institutions
at the local level, which includes school boards.371 In turn, this broadened definition
of federalism may increase the political influence of marginalized groups.372 In her
words, “the power minorities wield is that of the servant, not the sovereign; the in-
sider, not the outsider. They enjoy a muscular form of voice—the power not just to
complain about national policy, but to help set it.”373 With this conception of federal-
ism, Professor Gerken suggests that equality norms and rights found in the First and
court’s order to remove multi-member districts as constitutional based on previous
discrimination against black and Mexican voters).
365 Rebecca L. Brown, The Logic of Majority Rule, 9 J. CONST. L. 23, 25 (2006).
366 Id. at 29.
367 Three justifications are given: (1) the historical primacy of majority rule in the United
States; (2) majority rule promotes utilitarianism; and (3) majority rule that “advance[s] the
individual values of civic virtue and intellectual character that are important to republican
theory.” Id. at 32.
368 Id. at 39.
369 Id. at 41. Professor Brown suggests that the second principle may be fulfilled through
lawmakers providing reasons for their decisions. Id.
370 Heather Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2010).
371 Id. at 21.
372 Id. at 6–11.
373 Id. at 7–8. In explaining this argument further, Professor Gerken writes that “the ser-
vant possesses power to push back, even resist, because he is inside the system, not outside
of it. As insiders to the system, servants exercise a muscular form of ‘voice,’ as they can set
policy rather than merely complain about it.” Id. at 39.
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Fourteenth Amendments gain structural support.374 The theory of federalism-all-the-
way-down resonates well with local control through school boards.375 Both scholars
and the Court recognize the potential advantages to preserv-ing the local control of
public education despite the national government’s role.376 If correct, this permits
traditionally marginalized groups to more fully participate in governance.377
In the last several years, many changes have occurred on the local level that
threaten the ability of our most vulnerable students to be satisfactorily represented
through school boards.378 Structural reforms, economic downturn, and demographic
shifts have affected high-profile districts. The Common Core provisions may seem
to undercut the possibilities for parents to edge into meaningful partnerships with
the education system. As we move ever closer to a common standard for quality
public education, we must remain equally conscious of children’s only direct repre-
sentatives in this democratic process: their parents.
In California, Latina/o parents may not have a final say on whether ELL students
should receive a bilingual, immersion, or content-based transition. However, these
parents need a venue to air their opinions. Similarly, Memphis parents should have
a voice in disturbing resources to better educate their children. And state or local
control should not dominate the conversations in Chicago and Philadelphia regard-
ing school closures: The community holds a stake in decisions affecting the safety
and quality of education provided to their children.
CONCLUSION
Public education disappointments reignite ingrained conflicts between govern-
ment decision-making bodies and their constituents. Local school board activities,
more so than state and federal agencies, magnify these entrenched challenges.
Across the country, school districts confront unique regional differences that morph
from common cores—economic distress and binding cross cultures to build a strong
374 Id. at 9.
375 Id. at 38 (“School committees wield power not because they preside over their own
empires, but because state legislatures depend on them to help run the education system.
States and local officials administering federal law can edit the law they lack the power to
authorize precisely because they are inside the system, not outside of it.”).
376 Id. at 30 (“The institutions that make up federalism-all-the-way-down ensure variation
in the identity of the decision-makers and in the context in which a decision is made. Some
feature direct participation by everyday citizens, some are small and deliberative, some reach
decisions unmediated by political parties or electoral politics, and some sound in a bureau-
cratic cadence. Some allow durable minorities to rule; others empower transitional minorities.
To the extent that the majority and minority disagree, federalism-all-the-way-down allows
them to revisit that conflict in different contexts featuring different power dynamics.”).
377 Id. at 47.
378 See, e.g., supra Part III.
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public education system. As set forth, politics plays a role in stabilizing institutions
able to produce quality educational programs. If not careful, the parents of already
marginalized students who desperately need representation may be ostracized.
Parents unlock the door to enabling the future generation’s renewed hope through
academic achievement. Expanding local control to provide not only deference to
school officials, but also a conscious review of parent and community participation
in policymaking, would evoke the true meaning behind our Equal Protection Clause
and deliberative democracy.
